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CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
KATE SABLOSKY ELENGOLD

ABSTRACT
This Article considers whether the consumer protection doctrine offers a more
promising avenue to remedying certain forms of discrimination than the
antidiscrimination doctrine. Using a housing discrimination story as a case
study, this Article breaks down the doctrinal trade-offs between seeking redress
through a consumer protection claim and an antidiscrimination claim. This
Article argues that a consumer protection claim is not only a viable avenue to
remedying certain forms of discrimination but also has a higher likelihood of
success than a traditional antidiscrimination claim.
Consumer protection claims might appear undesirable because they lack the
important anti-subordination and group-based equality norms at the root of civil
rights law. This Article argues that this is something of an illusion. Civil rights
advocacy historically focused on economic citizenship, but formal civil rights
doctrine came to omit economic protections. The antidiscrimination doctrine
developed narrowly, constraining the reach of its remedies. Antidiscrimination
statutes thus have failed to reach advocates’ aspiration for achieving groupbased equality. Consumer protection law, solidly grounded in the protection of
economic citizenship, is well-suited to those aspirations. Consumer protection
claims therefore usefully align with and supplement the objectives of civil rights
law.
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INTRODUCTION
Julia Forman is a forty-two-year-old Black woman.1 She is seeking an
apartment in Raleigh, North Carolina. She reads about an open two-bedroom
apartment at Orange Haven Apartments on rent.com that is available for $750
per month. The apartment building is old and near a highway, but it has
amenities, including a pool, workout facility, and in-unit laundry. It is also near
a bus stop, which would allow Julia easy access to employment opportunities.
The neighborhood in Raleigh is racially diverse, but a recent influx of upperclass White families has led to quicker responses from emergency services,
community and economic development, and a high-end grocery store. Julia goes
to the apartment complex to inquire about the available apartment. The landlord,
Bill Herman, tells Julia that all of the two-bedroom units have been rented, but
that a one-bedroom apartment might be coming available in the following
month. He quotes her $800 per month for the one-bedroom apartment. Bill does
not ask Julia about her income or credit history and tells her to check back in
three weeks if she is still interested.
Julia checks the rent.com listing when she gets home and notes that the twobedroom apartment at Orange Haven Apartments is still listed as available.
Suspicious, she asks her friend George Simon, a forty-five-year-old White man,
to swing by the apartment complex on his way home from work to see if he can
get any information about either the two-bedroom or one-bedroom apartment.
When George arrives, he too is greeted by Bill Herman. Bill informs George
that, indeed, he has a two-bedroom unit available and quotes him the same price
listed on rent.com―$750 per month. He also tells George that he has a onebedroom apartment available, offers to show him the apartment, and tells George
that it rents for $650 per month. When George leaves the apartment complex,
Bill sends him off with a rental application and lets George know that he will
follow up in the next couple of days. Bill never asks about George’s income or
credit history.2
1 For reasons I set forth in an earlier work, I choose to capitalize the terms “Black” and
“White” unless they appear in a quotation. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity,
93 DENV. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (2015). In keeping with the trend of omitting hyphens when using
terms that combine ethnicities or nationalities, I also employ the term “African American”
without a hyphen. Id.
2
This case study is a hypothetical. The facts, however, are representative of fair housing
cases from around the country. Julia’s visit to the apartment complex, followed by George’s
visit to the apartment complex, is similar to testing that is designed to uncover subtle housing
discrimination. Courts have recognized the legitimacy of testing such evidence in housing
discrimination cases. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (“That
the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive
false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the
simple fact of injury . . . .”). Reputable organizations, including the United States Department
of Justice (“DOJ”), have entire teams devoted to fair housing testing. See Fair Housing
Testing Program, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-testing-program-1 [https://
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This Article uses Julia’s story as a tool to consider whether the consumer
protection doctrine affords a viable avenue to remedy discrimination, especially
for individual plaintiffs.3 It analyzes Julia’s experience under both an
perma.cc/M4AY-8RFQ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that testing is a valuable tool to
investigate housing market practices and to document illegal housing discrimination); see also
Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41
URB. LAW. 319, 321 (2009) (“Testing is specifically authorized in the Fair Housing Act under
the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) and the Fair Housing Assistance Program
(FHAP), each of which is administered and managed by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).”). For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted
testing evidence in a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) case, including one test where a Black tester
was informed that a one-bedroom apartment was $500 per month and a White tester was later
informed that the same apartment was $480 per month. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d
916, 924 (7th Cir. 1992) (accepting “testing” as method of ferreting out discrimination and
explaining how it was used in this case). Testers were also used in Metro Fair Housing
Services, Inc. v. Morrowood Garden Apartments, Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1090 (N.D. Ga. 1983),
where a resident manager told the Black tester that no two-bedroom apartments were available
and that she could place her name on a waitlist for a one-bedroom apartment; he then told the
White tester that no two-bedroom would be available until fall but that a one-bedroom
apartment would be available the following month. Id. at 1095 (denying defendant’s motion
for summary judgment for plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim); see also Miller v. Spring
Valley Props., 202 F.R.D. 244, 246-47 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (detailing how apartment rental agent
allegedly misrepresented availability of apartments to African Americans at several
properties); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (explaing how
apartment agent told Black applicants that there were no units available to rent when, in fact,
there were twenty appropriate units vacant at property). Unlike the amateur test Julia and
George put together, most tests undertaken by professional fair housing investigators would
isolate one variable protected class (i.e., race or sex). See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, Paired Testing and the Housing Discrimination Studies,
EVIDENCE MATTERS (2014), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring14/high
light2.html [https://perma.cc/8BP5-6RZY]. Julia’s situation, however, more accurately
describes the set of facts and circumstances that an individual prospective renter might face
in trying to determine whether he or she has been the victim of housing discrimination or an
unfair or deceptive act.
3 While this Article focuses on a particular case study, it does so to illustrate the costs and
benefits of two statutory schemes and doctrines. It looks to the federal FHA to illuminate the
benefits and risks of using antidiscrimination law to remedy civil rights violations. It looks to
state unfair and deceptive practices acts to illuminate the benefits and risks of using consumer
protection law to remedy civil rights violations. While not every fact pattern involving
discriminatory conduct could take advantage of the analysis herein, this Article is relevant to
myriad fact patterns and multiple laws. For further analysis, see infra notes 21-22, 237-244
and accompanying text (explaining how consumer protection doctrine offers a plausible
means of remedying discrimination under several causes of action). More importantly, the
Article concludes that consumer protection claims can and should be utilized as a tool for
achieving civil rights, especially in light of the historical inability of antidiscrimination law
to fully reach its anti-subordination and group-based equality goals. Such a conclusion is
unconstrained by the specifics of the case study used to develop and illustrate its analysis.
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antidiscrimination and a consumer protection framework, setting out the
doctrinal benefits and drawbacks of pursuing each claim. It argues not only that
a consumer protection claim is a viable avenue to remedying certain forms of
discrimination commonly considered under traditional antidiscrimination law,
but also that such an approach has fewer hurdles to clear and a higher likelihood
of success than a traditional civil rights claim.
Substituting a consumer protection claim for a traditional civil rights claim is
not, however, without normative implications. A consumer protection approach
is a universalist approach to remedying discrimination. In other words, its
remedies are available to all people without regard to identity-based protected
classes.4 Such approaches can be, and have been, critiqued for failing to achieve
anti-subordination or group-based equality goals inherent in civil rights
protections.5 Primarily, critics contend that universalist approaches adopt, and
thus condone, a post-racial, colorblind perception of modern America.6 This
Article recognizes the value and legitimacy of such arguments. Even so, it argues
that the history of civil rights advocacy and the failure of the antidiscrimination
doctrine to achieve group-based equality goals counsels toward enlarging the
legal mechanisms for achieving civil rights remedies. Further, the historic
understanding of economic citizenship7 as a measure of full and free
participation in a democratic society suggests that consumer protection can—
and should—be a primary tool in the fight for equality.8
Part I of this Article analyzes the doctrinal relationship between
antidiscrimination and consumer protection jurisprudence. It asks: (1) can one
use consumer protection law to remedy discrimination and (2) what are the
trade-offs between an antidiscrimination claim and a consumer protection
claim? Offering Julia’s case as an example, this Article considers the elements
and the remedies of an antidiscrimination claim under the federal Fair Housing
4 Professor Samuel Bagenstos defines “universalist” and “universalistic” approaches to
civil rights synonymously as a methodology that “either guarantees a uniform floor of rights
or benefits for all persons or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad group of
people not defined according to the identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our
antidiscrimination laws.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on
Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014).
5 See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of universalist
approaches to civil rights violations).
6 Charlotte S. Alexander, Zev J. Eigen & Camille Gear Rich, Post-Racial Hydraulics: The
Hidden Dangers of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2016) (defining “post-racial”
as “a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior
as evidenced by America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial progress”); infra Section III.A
(explaining how universalist approaches have been criticized as adopting post-racial
colorblind perception of America).
7 See infra note 10 (tracing historical development of “economic citizenship” concept).
8 See infra Section II.A (discussing relationship between economic citizenship and civil
rights).
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Act (“FHA”) and of a consumer protection claim under a state law prohibiting
unfair and deceptive consumer transactions (“UDAP”).9 It concludes that Julia’s
UDAP claim is not only viable but also more likely to succeed than her
antidiscrimination claim. The analysis and conclusion of Part I begs the
normative question: even if consumer protection could provide a path to
remedying certain forms of discrimination, should scholars, advocates, and
victims take that path?
Part II provides context for the normative discussion, exploring the historic
development of the antidiscrimination doctrine. It makes two relevant
observations: (1) civil rights advocacy throughout American history has
promoted economic citizenship as a key component of civil rights and (2) the
antidiscrimination doctrine has developed narrowly, severing the relationship
between economic and civil rights, and otherwise constraining the ability of civil
rights law to achieve anti-subordination and group-based equality goals.
“Economic citizenship” in this context is defined as “the achievement of an
independent and relatively autonomous status that marks self-respect and
provides access to the full play of power and influence that defines participation
in a democratic society.”10 Finally, Part III tackles the normative question head
9 JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 97-98 (4th ed. 2013)
(defining and explaining development of state unfair and deceptive consumer practices laws,
often known as “little FTC acts” or “UDAP statutes”). State statutes have different names,
different designs, and arose from a variety of models. See Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball
Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer
Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 286-91 (2015) (recognizing that
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now known as Uniform Law
Commission), American Law Institute, and Council of State Governments, drafted model acts
that were widely used by states as they developed state UDAP laws). For ease of reference,
this Article refers to state laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive consumer transactions as
“UDAP statutes.”
10 ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (2001) (defining “economic
citizenship” and discussing it through feminist theory lens). Civil rights activists sought full
and free access to traditional routes to economic and financial well-being, including access to
credit, home mortgages, and goods and services. See THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS
TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1
(2009) (“Dreams of economic justice had long been central to the black freedom struggle and
to King’s social gospel vision.”). The concept of “economic citizenship” has been critiqued
by scholars challenging the “exclusionary tendencies” of citizenship in America and
internationally. See Mary Condon & Lisa Philipps, Transnational Market Governance and
Economic Citizenship: New Frontiers for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
105, 113 (2005) (“In addition, post-colonial and critical race scholars have called attention to
the normative presuppositions of Western concepts of citizenship and the denial of citizenship
privileges to racialized, colonized, and foreign others.”); Annelise Orleck, Gender, Race, and
Citizenship Rights: New Views of an Ambivalent History, 29 FEMINIST STUD. 85, 95 (2003)
(“[N]arrow constructions of U.S. citizenship . . . long excluded more people than they
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on. It considers what might be gained by turning to consumer protection to
remedy discrimination. Situated in the literature on colorblind, universalist, and
race-conscious approaches to civil rights concerns, it also considers what might
be lost.
This Article fills a hole in the academic literature about the relationship
between the antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrines.11 It suggests
that, paradoxically, the consumer protection doctrine, a universalist approach to
remedying economic injustice, might in certain circumstances be a better avenue
to remedying discrimination than relying on traditional civil rights remedies.
And it goes one step further, arguing that, in light of the historical economic
citizenship goals of the civil rights movements and failures of the current
antidiscrimination doctrine, consumer protection law and advocacy can and
should be understood as a critical tool in the fight for full and adequate civil
rights.
I.

ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVES

This Part considers whether the consumer protection doctrine can afford a
legal remedy for victims of discrimination. Using Julia’s story as a case study,
included.”). Nevertheless, this Article uses the language and lens of “economic citizenship”
because it best describes the overlapping language and principles of the civil rights and
consumer movements of the mid-twentieth century. See MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS:
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 150-64 (2005) (recognizing unique
coalitions in the wake of the New Deal that centered around desire to increase consumer
purchasing power); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123
YALE L.J. 2698, 2701 (2014) (recognizing how economic justice-minded leaders in civil
rights movement pushed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others to include a vision of
economic citizenship as part of civil rights movement platform); William E. Forbath, Civil
Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor
Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 702-09 (2000) (tracing concept of economic
citizenship through overlapping civil rights and labor movements). As used in this Article,
the concept of “economic citizenship” bears no relationship to one’s legal status in America.
11 Although there has been significant academic treatment of the relationship between the
labor movement and the civil rights movement, see, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 10, at 15-23
(discussing Dr. King’s role in labor movement), the role of the consumer movement in that
conversation has been largely ignored. And while scholars have considered discrimination in
retail, car sales, and lending, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 15-43 (1992) (retail); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1991) (car sales);
Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify Federal Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 529 (1993) (lending); Deseriee
A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection,
66 MO. L. REV. 275, 276 (2001) (retail); Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 332 (1995) (lending), outside of
lending discrimination, there has been little attention paid to the overlap of the
antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrines.
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it argues that both antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrine afford
Julia legal remedies to vindicate her rights. It then breaks down the doctrinal
trade-offs between a consumer protection claim and a traditional
antidiscrimination claim. It concludes that, due in large part to the original
design of the consumer protection and antidiscrimination statutes and their
subsequent doctrinal development, the consumer protection doctrine affords
individual victims of discrimination an easier path to and greater likelihood of
attaining a remedy under law. Although this Part focuses its attention on Julia’s
story of housing discrimination, the analysis in this Article is not limited to such
specific factual situations—the final section of this Part briefly explores
additional applications.
A.

The Claims
1.

The Antidiscrimination Claim

The relevant antidiscrimination statutes under which Julia’s claim could arise
are the federal FHA,12 the North Carolina State Fair Housing Act,13 or both. The
FHA prohibits discrimination in any dwelling, private or public, intended as a
residence for one or more families, including vacant land on which a residence
might be placed.14 The FHA prohibits discrimination based on certain protected
classes—race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and

12 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012) (laying out general policy of United States to provide
for fair housing).
13 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41A-1 to 41A-10 (2018). Like many state fair housing statutes, the
North Carolina State Fair Housing Act parallels the protections in the federal FHA. Compare
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (prohibiting discrimination related to housing because of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, handicapping condition, or familial status), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (prohibiting discrimination related to housing because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, handicap, or familial status). Most states and many localities have analog fair
housing statutes, some of which prohibit discrimination on the basis of additional protected
classes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (2015) (protected classes include race, color,
religion, creed, sex, national origin/ancestry, disability/handicap, sexual orientation (defined
to include “transgender status”), marital status, and familial status); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8107 (2018) (including as protected classes race, color, religion/creed, national origin,
disability, sexual orientation, marital or partnership status, age, alienage or citizenship status,
gender, gender identity, lawful occupation, lawful source of income, pregnancy, presence of
children, and status as victim of domestic violence). For ease of reference, the remainder of
the Section assumes that an antidiscrimination claim is made pursuant to the federal FHA.
14 The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families,
and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon
of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(b), 3603(a)(2)
(defining dwelling to include, after Dec. 31, 1968, all public and private dwellings not
otherwise exempted).
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disability.15 Specifically, the FHA prohibits a landlord or other housing provider
from refusing to sell or rent housing; making housing unavailable;
discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental; making or
publishing a statement indicating a preference or limitation of resident; and/or
falsely telling a prospective resident that housing is unavailable because of such
individual’s membership in a specified protected class.16 Courts have read the
fair housing protections broadly, especially the prohibition against “otherwise
mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing] a dwelling.”17
To prevail on her claim of housing discrimination, Julia would need to
establish that Bill Herman: (1) made the apartment unavailable to her; (2)
discriminated against her in the terms or conditions of the rental; and/or (3)
represented to her that the two-bedroom apartment was not available, even
though it was ready for occupancy. Julia would also need to establish that Bill
took those actions because of her race, color, and/or sex. To prove improper
motive, Julia would likely rely on the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.18 She must prove intentional discrimination based on her membership
in a protected class and subclass.
15

Id. § 3604.
Id. § 3604(a)-(d). The FHA also prohibits steering, discrimination in real estate
transactions, and failure to design and construct housing built after 1991 in accordance with
accessibility requirements, among other prohibitions. Id. §§ 3604(e)-(f), 3605 (setting forth
accessibility requirements and prohibiting discrimination in residential real estate-related
transactions).
17 Id. § 3604(a); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1995)
(recognizing the FHA’s “‘broad and inclusive’ compass” and “according a ‘generous
construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision” (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972))); Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]laintiffs persuasively argue that it
would have been unreasonable for Congress to include a laundry list of all possible housingrelated transactions covered by the FHA, and that the broad, general language—reflected in
phrases such as ‘otherwise make unavailable or deny’—was intended to be flexible enough
to cover multiple types of housing-related transactions.”); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp.
1169, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (interpreting phrase “otherwise make unavailable or deny a
dwelling” to be “as broad as Congress could have made it”).
18 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). For further explanation, see infra Section I.B.1 (explaining
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and burden-shifting framework). Courts have looked at
the specific facts of FHA cases to determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded and
proved intentional discrimination, looking to McDonnell Douglas as a “sensible, orderly way
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of
discrimination.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)
(noting that McDonnell Douglas framework was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic” (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))). Julia could
also rely on the “mixed-motive” test developed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), to establish that she was a victim of housing
16
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2. The Consumer Protection Claim
Julia may have multiple consumer protection claims arising from her
experience at Orange Haven Apartments. Most clearly, she could bring state law
claims under a state UDAP statute or pursuant to a common law or statutory
fraud claim.
To make out a claim of fraud in North Carolina, Julia would need to establish:
(1) false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably
calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which did in fact
deceive, (5) resulting in damage to her.19 Because fraud is widely recognized as
a difficult claim to win,20 the remainder of this Section focuses on a claim under
a UDAP statute.21
To make out a claim under the North Carolina UDAP statute, Julia must
establish: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting
discrimination. Id. at 244-45 (holding that once plaintiff “shows that gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability
only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender
to play such a role”). Price Waterhouse was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
section 107, which allows an employment discrimination claim to proceed if the plaintiff
establishes that her protected class status was a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment
action, even where other factors were also considered. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1074, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)). Not all civil
rights claims can take advantage of mixed-motive findings. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009) (holding that age must be “but for” cause of discrimination
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Gross has not (yet) been extended to the
FHA. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 616 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although
Gross may cast doubt on this conclusion, by its terms, Gross applies only to the ADEA, and
we decline to address whether Gross applies to the FHA in the absence of clearer guidance
from the Supreme Court.”).
19 Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 1974) (laying out five-prong test).
20 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 48-51 (2005) (exposing difficult hurdles inherent
in making out common law fraud claim and recognizing that federal and state unfair and
deceptive trade practices statutes fill in gaps to remedy such violations); Dee Pridgen, The
Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private Enforcement of Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 917 (2017).
21
The goal of this Article is not to set forth a litigation plan for those seeking to use UDAP
statutes to pursue discrimination remedies; rather, this Article is designed to be a thought
experiment—what would happen if we considered discrimination through the lens of
consumer law? It matters less whether Julia can make out a specific claim under a specific
law in a specific state than whether scholars and advocates should consider reframing the
conversation through a consumer protection, rather than antidiscrimination, framework. If the
reader is persuaded that the consumer protection doctrine offers a plausible and effective
means of remedying certain forms of discrimination, including facts similar to those set forth
in Julia’s story, the reader should consider the possibilities under several consumer protection
theories, including UDAP and common law fraud.
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commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to [her].”22 A practice is
unfair when it “offends established public policy as well as when the practice is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to
consumers.”23 A litigant can also prove a claim under the state UDAP statute by
showing a “deceptive” act or practice, which is one that “possesse[s] the
tendency or capacity to mislead, or create[s] the likelihood of deception.”24
While North Carolina courts have held that the plaintiff must plead and prove
some kind of egregious or aggravating circumstance beyond a breach of
contract,25 they have also recognized that a “party is guilty of an unfair act or
practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion
of its power or position.”26 North Carolina and other state courts look to federal
law construing the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) to define “unfair”
and “deceptive.”27 As is true in many other states, North Carolina courts have
applied the state UDAP statute to the relationship between landlords and
tenants.28 To make out her UDAP claim, Julia would need to establish that Bill
engaged in at least one unfair or deceptive act.
22

Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d mem.,
597 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (citing Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 901
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002)). This is consistent with other state UDAP laws. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002) (construing Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to require: (1) deceptive or unfair act or practice
by defendant, (2) defendant’s intent that plaintiff rely on the deception, and (3) occurrence of
deception during course of conduct involving trade or commerce).
23 Melton, 576 S.E.2d at 368 (citing Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981)).
24 Id. (citing Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)).
25 Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., 740 S.E.2d 923, 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
The aggravating circumstance requirement generally arises in cases alleging both breach of
contract and violation of UDAP; the plaintiff must allege something beyond breach of
contract. See Chapel H.O.M. Assocs., LLC v. RME Mgmt., LLC, 808 S.E.2d 576, 579 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2017) (stating that mere breach of contract is insufficent to establish UDAP claim).
26 Supplee v. Miller-Motte Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing McInerney v. Pinehurst Area Realty, Inc., 590 S.E.2d 313, 316-17 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004)).
27 See, e.g., Martinez v. Freedom Mortg. Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836-37 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (looking to FTC’s definition of “unfair” to understand Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act).
28 See, e.g., Crawford v. Nawrath, No. 16-cv-15955, 2016 WL 4608184, at *3 (N.C. Ct.
App. Sept. 6, 2016) (recognizing that “landlord, who collects rent after having knowledge of
the uninhabitable nature of a house, or just a part of a house, is engaging in unfair trade
practices in violation of Section 75-1.1”); Stanley v. Moore, 439 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 454 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1995) (stating it is “clear that
a tenant is a consumer for purposes of the [UDAP] Act and that the leasing of residential
property is within the purview of [N.C. GEN. STAT.] § 75-1.1,” and that “landlord” is defined
as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having
the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by [N.C. GEN. STAT.
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The Design and Doctrine

This Section argues that the design of the antidiscrimination and consumer
protection statutes, as the courts have developed and implemented them,
significantly affects the ability of each doctrine to remedy discrimination. The
design of antidiscrimination statutes focuses protection on specified protected
classes—race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and familial status,
for example.29 Although that design might have been meant to root out
discrimination, the judicial development of the doctrine has constricted and
limited its usefulness in three primary ways. First, the statutory design limits
protection to discrete and rigid protected classes, acting as a gatekeeper for its
protections. The judicial interpretation of that design has limited protection for
victims of discrimination whose identities fall outside the protected class(es) and
for victims of discrimination whose identities straddle protected classes
(“intersectional” or “complex” plaintiffs).30 Second, antidiscrimination statutes
were designed to prohibit conduct that discriminates “because of” the plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class. For individual plaintiffs like Julia, that design
requires proof of intent, which scholars have empirically shown is a significant
§ 42-40]”); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826, 833-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that landlord’s failure to maintain apartment in habitable condition could form basis
of UDAP violation). For a catalogue of state UDAP statutes, case law, and their relationship
to landlord-tenant law, see NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES § 2.2.6 (9th ed. 2016), https://library.nclc.org/UDAP [https://perma.cc/DM5GHAXU] (cataloguing court decisions finding UDAP applicable to various landlord-tenant
transactions, including residential lease practices, in numerous states). See also Sager v. Hous.
Comm’n, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 558-61 (D. Md. 2012) (applying Maryland Consumer
Protection Act to relationship between tenant and landlord housing authority); Anast v.
Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing cases establishing
application of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to landlordtenant relationships). In some jurisdictions, violation of state landlord-tenant law is a per se
UDAP violation. See, e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.17(6)(f) (2014) (stating landlord’s
interference with tenant’s right of quiet enjoyment is per se UDAP violation).
29 The laws differ slightly in the designations of protected classes. The FHA prohibits
discrimination in housing because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and
familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, prohibits discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2; supra note 13 (providing examples of protected classes under
different state laws).
30 Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479,
2494-517 (1994) (defining “complex plaintiffs”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (defining
intersectional plaintiffs); Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why
Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299,
301 (2005) (defining “intersectionals” as “persons who are members of more than one ‘lowstatus’ category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”).
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barrier to success under the law, especially for intersectional plaintiffs and
plaintiffs alleging intersectional discrimination.31 Third, the focus on the
plaintiff’s identity is at odds with the Supreme Court’s recent turn away from
robust identity-dependent civil rights protections.32 Taken together, the design
and doctrinal development of antidiscrimination law has limited and constrained
the law’s utility in vindicating individual plaintiff’s civil rights.
This Section also compares the design and doctrine of antidiscrimination law
to that of consumer protection law. Unlike a plaintiff invoking the
antidiscrimination doctrine, a plaintiff asserting a consumer protection claim
need not plead or prove her identity, nor must she connect that identity to the
defendant’s conduct. Rather, the legal inquiry is squarely and exclusively on
proving the defendant’s bad act. This Section argues that, because of that design
difference, consumer protection offers a viable and important avenue for
remedying certain forms of discrimination.

31 This Article considers the use and role of antidiscrimination and consumer protection
statutes in individual, rather than class action or pattern-or-practice challenges. While both
legal structures can challenge large-scale discrimination, see Prigden, supra note 20, at 91924 (discussing means of using consumer protection law to achieve group remedies); Shayak
Sarkar & Josh Rosenthal, Exclusionary Taxation, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 619
(2018) (arguing policies regarding property tax assessments can be challenged under FHA’s
disparate impact protections), class actions, organizational plaintiffs, and pattern-or-practice
cases raise different doctrinal and normative considerations outside this Article’s scope. This
Article also focuses on intentional, or disparate treatment, discrimination. It limits its analysis
to disparate treatment not only because it is the appropriate corollary to an individual
consumer protection claim, but also because scholars have established that disparate impact
claims are difficult to plead, prove, and win, especially in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). See Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or
Should I Go?: The Future of Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act and
Implications for the Financial Services Industry, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 421, 460 (2015)
(recognizing that the Court upheld use of disparate impact under FHA, but that it did so by
imposing “significant limitations” on its application, including a “robust causality”
requirement); Justin D. Cummins & Beth Belle Isle, Toward Systemic Equality:
Reinvigorating a Progressive Application of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 43 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 102, 132 (2017) (recognizing limits of disparate impact doctrine after key
Supreme Court cases); Daniel Sheehan, Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing
Act After Inclusive Communities, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 391,
392 (2017) (arguing that “majority opinion [in Inclusive Communities], written by Justice
Kennedy, affirms that the FHA encompasses disparate impact liability for public and private
actors, but it tightly constrains that liability”). But see Steven M. Dane, The Potential Impact
of Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project
on Future Civil Rights Enforcement and Compliance, FED. LAW., July 2016, at 39 (arguing
that disparate impact theory under FHA was confirmed by and remains potent after Inclusive
Communities).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
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The Constraints of Antidiscrimination Law’s Design and Doctrine

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,33 followed closely in time by
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.34 Both statutes structured civil rights protections
around identified protected classes. Those laws require a plaintiff to establish
that a defendant discriminated against her “because of” her membership in a
specific protected class.35 The design of the legislation and the doctrine’s
development have constrained plaintiffs’ ability to remedy discrimination.
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas. In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court developed a burden shifting analysis to permit civil rights
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on direct or
circumstantial evidence. To establish a prima facie case for employment
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant’s qualifications.36
At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a valid and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.37 If the defendant is successful, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the stated reason is “mere
pretext” for discrimination.38 In its 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins39
decision, the Supreme Court also developed a “mixed-motive” analysis,

33

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
34 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012)).
35 This design is replicated in other civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age . . . .”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.”).
36 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas
analysis extends across protected class and has been applied to other antidiscrimination
statutes, including the FHA. See, e.g., Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th
Cir. 1997).
37 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
38 Id. at 798.
39 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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whereby a plaintiff can “show[] that gender [or another protected class] played
a motivating part in an employment decision” to establish liability under
antidiscrimination law.40 The defendant will be liable unless he can prove that
he “would have made the same decision even if [he] had not allowed gender to
play such a role.”41 The test set forth in McDonnell Douglas, supplemented by
the analysis in Price Waterhouse, acts as the organizing principle for developing,
pleading, and analyzing statutory civil rights claims.42
Antidiscrimination law’s protected class design limits the utility of the law—
it operates as both a gatekeeper and a labyrinth for plaintiffs seeking a judicial
remedy for discrimination.43 First, it is a gatekeeper. To prevail, a civil rights
plaintiff must establish that she is a member of one of the designated protected
classes.44 She must also designate and establish her subclass.45 In other words,
if a plaintiff believes she was discriminated against because she is Black, she
must state her protected class (i.e., race) and then establish how her membership
in a subclass (i.e., African American) resulted in differential treatment.46 Only
then is she even eligible for the protections of the antidiscrimination doctrine. It
is true that, in certain situations, courts have found violations of
antidiscrimination law when individuals are aggrieved or injured by
discrimination based on someone else’s protected class and subclass
membership, when the plaintiff is in the “zone of interest” protected by the

40

Id. at 244.
Id. at 244-45. For additional explanation, see supra note 18.
42 See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 101 (2017)
(arguing that statutory design of antidiscrimination law does not require that plaintiff prove
that she is member of protected class to gain access to protections, but that doctrine has
developed, primarily through application of McDonnell Douglas test, to apply such a
requirement).
43 See id. (arguing that “protected class gatekeeping” is undesirable).
44 The protected classes are limited by the designations identified by Congress or state
legislatures. For example, the FHA does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, source of income, or
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (designating only race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, and national origin as protected classes).
45 See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 485 (9th Cir. 2014); Elengold, supra note 1, at 4 (“In
order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that she was treated differently because of her
membership in a subclass of that protected class.”).
46 See id. at 4 n.12 (“For example, an African American alleging a violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may allege that she was the victim of discrimination because
she is African American, a particular bounded subclass of race.”). Certain provisions in the
civil rights canon also provide for a disparate impact analysis. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous.
and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015). Although
much of the analysis contained herein is applicable to disparate impact cases, the focus of this
Article is disparate treatment.
41
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antidiscrimination statutes.47 Even so, the plaintiff must still show intentional
discrimination because of someone’s membership in a protected class.
The protected class design limits access to civil rights protections for certain
plaintiffs and excludes certain experiences of discrimination from its design.
Most obviously, discrimination on the basis of certain identity traits falls outside
of the designated protected classes and thus is excluded from protection. Courts
have dismissed cases where the discrimination occurred because of sexual
orientation,48 nepotism,49 socioeconomic status,50 and profession.51
The protected class design is also a labyrinth for victims of discrimination.
Once the plaintiff clears the gatekeeping hurdle, she must navigate the

47

See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011) (finding plaintiff was
directly injured when his employer retaliated against him because plaintiff’s fiancé/co-worker
filed sex discrimination claim).
48 See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir.) (holding that Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557
(2017) (mem.); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258-59 (1st Cir.
1999) (same). But see Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (holding that discrimination on basis of sexual orientation is discrimination based on
sex in prohibition of Title VII); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351-52
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same).
49 See Sogluizzo v. Local 817, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (“Nepotism of itself does not violate Title VII. To come within the Civil Rights Act,
nepotism must somehow be related to a pattern of discrimination based on national origin or
another protected class.”).
50 See Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1495 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that
discrimination based on low socioeconomic status is “not actionable under section 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973]”).
51 See Simmons v. Braswell, No. 1:98-cv-01357, 1998 WL 333520, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May
19, 1998) (“Title VII does not grant this Court jurisdiction to hear complaints of
discrimination based upon profession.”). Scholars have argued that the protected class
categories should be expanded. See ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR
HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 234
(2013) (arguing protected class categories should be expanded to include “interraciality”);
Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 111 (2008) (proposing expansion of Title
VII protections to victims of domestic and sexual violence); Nancy Levit, Changing
Workforce Demographics and the Future of the Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 463, 497 (2012) (discussing “ways that the protected class approach has not
kept pace with the demographics and lived experiences of an ever-changing workforce”);
Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of “Look”Ism in Hiring Decisions: How Federal Law
Should Be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005) (proposing appearance-based discrimination be made illegal under
antidiscrimination law). While this discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is relevant
to highlight antidiscrimination law’s current structural limitations as relative to consumer
protection law’s flexible protections.
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procedural and evidentiary maze in connecting the defendant’s bad acts to her
membership in a protected class and subclass. For most civil rights plaintiffs,
that means they must prove intentional discrimination connected to membership
in the identified protected class and subclass.
Proving intentional discrimination is difficult because much of the evidence
is circumstantial; there is rarely “smoking gun” evidence of intentional
discrimination.52 In fact, circumstantial evidence is so important to proving
claims of discrimination that the Supreme Court built it into the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.53 Investigating and unearthing evidence of discriminatory
intent is discovery-intensive, expensive, and time-consuming.
Even when civil rights plaintiffs do uncover evidence of intentional
discrimination, they have difficulty convincing a judge or jury to ascribe
malicious intent.54 Studies show that even when there is direct evidence of
discrimination, judges and juries are generally unwilling to “characterize a
particular set of events as discrimination” if there is any other possible
explanation.55 Fewer than five percent of plaintiffs alleging discrimination
succeed in getting litigated relief; dismissals on the pleadings constitute almost
ninety percent of the litigated outcomes.56 For women and minorities, bias in the
52

See Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof: Presumption and Pretext in Disparate
Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 122 (1993); see also
Old W. End Ass’n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (N.D. Ohio 1987)
(“An intent to discriminate is rarely openly expressed.”).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 18 and 36 (explaining McDonnell Douglas analysis).
54 Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012) (“Indeed, even when there is
substantial evidence of traditional invidious discriminatory intent (including so-called direct
evidence) most people will decline to make attributions to discrimination.”).
55 Id. at 1278, 1299 (“Collectively, then, psychology scholars have found extensive support
for the conclusion that people are reluctant to make attributions to discrimination, even in the
presence of compelling ‘direct’ evidence, and even when given objective measures of the
likelihood that discrimination has occurred.”).
56 Id. at 1276 (“Indeed, less than 5% of all discrimination plaintiffs will ever achieve any
form of litigated relief. In contrast, dismissals (on motions to dismiss or at summary
judgment) are extremely common in discrimination litigation, accounting for a full 86% of
litigated outcomes.”). Professor Eyer also uses data and statistics to reject the notion that the
failure of discrimination plaintiffs to achieve litigated successes is because the meritorious
cases end in settlement. Id. at 1290-91; see also Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at
14-15 (citing to studies and scholars who have concluded that employment discrimination
cases are difficult to prove, vulnerable to summary judgment rulings, and face uphill battles
because judges and juries believe that employment discrimination has been “largely
eradicated”); Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015) (recognizing that borrowers have been largely
unsuccessful in making out “reverse redlining” antidiscrimination claims for predatory
lending in large part because “group-based or identity-based arguments are increasingly met
with judicial opposition”).
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assignment of liability and award of damages can further depress the likelihood
of success or the recovery of sufficient damages.57
The labyrinth is even more difficult to navigate for intersectional plaintiffs or
plaintiffs experiencing intersectional discrimination.58 Some individuals
combine the attributes of more than one protected class. Such individuals
include, for example, a Black woman, a Latino with disabilities, and a Muslim
from India. Antidiscrimination law’s protected class design forces such
plaintiffs to try to separate the strands of their own identity to isolate a single
basis for the perpetrator’s discriminatory conduct. This is an artificial,
impossible, and arguably harmful task.59
57 Studies have shown that, in both civil and criminal cases, women and minority litigants
are less successful than men and Whites. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS,
THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (recognizing disparities in
success rates based on race and gender in tort cases); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 998 (2003) ((citing DAVID C.
BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990)) (finding that defendants in two
thousand Georgia capital murder cases were 4.3 times more likely to receive death penalty if
victim was White than if victim was Black)); see also Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple
Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 991, 1019 (2011) (sharing 2011 interdisciplinary study showing that both
plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the basis of more than one ascriptive characteristic
and plaintiffs who are identified with more than one traditionally subordinated group find less
success in employment discrimination cases).
58 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing challenges for intersectional
plaintiffs). While all individuals have intersectional identities, individuals whose identities
straddle traditionally subjugated subclasses have struggled to attain legal remedies under
antidiscrimination law. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C. L. REV. 457,
465 (2018) (“[P]laintiffs exhibiting identification with more than one traditionally
subordinated group . . . and/or plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the basis of overlapping
ascriptive characteristics . . . are less successful in employment discrimination actions.”).
59 Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467,
1467-68 (1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race] (“African-American women by virtue of our
race and gender are situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and sexism.
This dual vulnerability does not simply mean that our burdens are doubled but instead, that
the dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are
sometimes unique to us.”). Professor Crenshaw is widely recognized as legal scholarship’s
architect of intersectionality theory, which has explored the individual and community harm
in requiring complex individuals to separate out and subjugate personal and group-identity
characteristics. See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 149-50 (“Black women’s experiences are
much broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the
continued insistence that Black women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical
analyses that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be
addressed.”). Intersectionality theory and post-intersectionality theory have generated a large
and impressive body of scholarship. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 30, at 2492-98 (assessing
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Of course, an intersectional plaintiff could allege that the discrimination she
endured resulted from bias due to multiple identity characteristics; nothing in
the statutory scheme prevents such a complaint. Advocates and courts, however,
have treated multiple claims as separate and distinct legal inquiries. Siloing of
the protected class claims proves devastating to claims of intersectional
discrimination. Quantitative and qualitative data establish that those claims are
more likely to fail;60 asserting multiple claims of discrimination proved to have
an inverse relationship to success on the merits.61

how Title VII doctrine has accommodated intersectional plaintiffs); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 703 (2001) (“The
project of this Essay is to demonstrate how identity performance theory—the area of
discrimination in which we have done most of our work—builds on intersectionality’s insight
that discrimination is based both on inter-group and intra-group distinctions.”); Crenshaw,
Race, supra (discussing intersectional issues related to sexual harassment of AfricanAmerican women); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991)
(“Focusing on two dimensions of male violence against women—battering and rape—I
consider how the experiences of women of color are frequently the product of intersecting
patterns of racism and sexism . . . .”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of
Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 290 (2001) (looking to intersectionality and postintersectionality literature to critique the essentialist considerations underlying the Human
Rights Campaign’s endorsement of Alfonse D’Amato in 1998); Peter Kwan, Complicity and
Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 686-90 (2000) (further
developing cosynthesis as theoretical model to build on intersectionality and postintersectionality theories); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1280-90 (1997) (developing theoretical model of cosynthesis to
conceptualize categories of race, gender, and sexual orientation); Serena Mayeri,
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 715 (2015)
(discussing how “pre-history of intersectionality” shaped Title VII).
60 See Abrams, supra note 30 passim (detailing courts’ treatment of intersectional claims
in civil rights suits); Mayeri, supra note 59, at 730 (documenting courts’ failure to develop
“robust canon of intersectionality case law”).
61 See Best et al., supra note 57, at 994-97 (explaining difficulties intersectional claimants
face and discussing lack of empirical research on litigation outcomes); Emma Reece Denny,
Note, Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 340 (2012) (“This Article aims to fill a hole
in the field of intersectionality research by introducing empirical data showing that courts do
indeed treat plaintiffs bringing multiple claims of discrimination (multiple claimants)
significantly worse than traditional, single-claim plantiffs (single claimants).”); Minna J.
Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1439, 1491-92 (2009) (explaining difficulties complex claimants face in attempting to prove
pretext); Mayeri, supra note 59, at 730 (“[R]ecent studies of how claims of ‘complex bias’
fare in court reflect a difficult climate for plaintiffs who claim multiple or intersectional forms
of employment discrimination.”); see also Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and
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Finally, recent developments at the Supreme Court suggest a turn away from
and antipathy to robust, group-based civil rights protections under federal law.
Leading constitutional and civil rights scholars have traced a recent shift in
Supreme Court jurisprudence away from robust substantive equal protection and
civil rights doctrine.62 Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2007 assertion for the
majority of the Court that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” exemplifies this shift.63 Scholars
have proposed different theories to explain the recent trend, including the
Court’s adoption of post-racialism,64 anxiety about the increased pluralism in
America,65 increased focus on social cohesion,66 or a backlash against the
antidiscrimination movement.67 Whatever the explanation, the Court’s current
approach to civil rights protections—constitutional and statutory—further limits
the utility of the doctrine to remedy discrimination and exacerbates the barriers
to success in any such legal action.
Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 234-35 (2006)
(proposing amendment to Title VII that expressly includes intersectional claims).
62 Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 (2002)
(theorizing that the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence can be explained by antipathy to
the “liberal” antidiscrimination movement and hostility to “the more ‘radical’ extensions of
antidiscrimination law, especially those that seek to protect traditionally unprotected groups,
extend antidiscrimination ideas to unusual contexts, or push the law beyond the principle of
formal legal equality”); Reva B. Seigel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286-303 (2011)
(defining and describing “antibalkanization” perspective emerging from the Supreme Court
in its construction of race equality cases); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (“Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied
constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited
Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation. . . . These cases signal
the end of equality doctrine as we have known it.”).
63 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
64 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 4 (“Increasingly, courts and the public have
begun to embrace post-racialism, that is, the view that race discrimination is rare and racebased protections are no longer necessary.”); Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial
Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 395 (2017) (“The Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence is decidedly postracial, in the sense that decision after decision from the Court
rests on postracial doctrinal principles and factual premises.”).
65 Yoshino, supra note 62, at 748 (“The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
reflects this pluralism anxiety. Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied
constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited
Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation.”).
66 Seigel, supra note 62, at 1300 (“[T]he Justices at the center of the Court who have cast
the deciding votes to uphold and limit race-conscious civil rights initiatives often explain their
position in opinions concerned with threats to social cohesion.”).
67 Rubenfeld, supra note 62, at 1142 (theorizing that the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence is developing as backlash against the “liberal” antidiscrimination movement).
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The Benefits and Risks of the Antidiscrimination Claim

It is useful to put this in the context of Julia’s case. To succeed on a claim
under the FHA, Julia must prove that Bill refused to rent to her, misrepresented
the availability of an apartment, and/or otherwise made housing unavailable to
her.68 She must also connect that bad act (or those bad acts) to her membership
in a subclass (or subclasses) of protected class(es).
Julia is a Black woman. In her complaint, Julia must identify the subclass or
classes upon which she believes Bill based his decision to deny her housing. In
other words, prior to any discovery, she must identify the “correct” protected
class (or classes) upon which Bill based his decision to make housing
unavailable to her.69 Then, to prove that Bill provided her false information
about the availability or price of the apartment because of her protected class
status, Julia will need to engage in extensive and expensive discovery. She will
need to develop evidence that Bill lied to her about the availability and/or cost
of the apartment and that it was because of her protected class status. To do that,
she will need significant documentary discovery in hopes of finding notes,
emails, or admissions to that effect. In the absence of documentary evidence, she
will need to depose the landlord and likely several others to understand whether
he had made statements or taken actions consistent with discriminatory leasing.
Most likely, Julia will need to track down others who have fallen victim to Bill’s
discriminatory actions to corroborate her testimony and establish a pattern of
discriminatory conduct. Such an undertaking will likely be prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming.
Alleging discrimination may also be emotionally taxing for Julia. Because
Julia is asserting that her damages flowed from discrimination against her
because of her status as a Black person, a woman, or a Black woman, the
defendant can ask questions about her identity, her prior experiences with racism
and/or sexism, and her feelings about how race and/or sex played into this case.
That discovery may very well be extensive and invasive, including intense and
personal interrogatories, requests for production of documents, deposition
questions, and cross examination. After all of that, Julia’s antidiscrimination

68 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (making it unlawful to refuse to rent, misrepresent availability,
or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling on the basis of plaintiff’s protected class
membership).
69 If this was an employment discrimination matter, Julia would first need to make a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id. § 2000e5(f)(1) (describing administrative exhaustion requirements). She could also choose to fill out
a similar form and file a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”). See id. § 3610 (providing optional administrative adjudicative process). To do that,
Julia would need to fill out a form, where she must check a box (or more than one box)
asserting her relevant protected class(es). For a deeper understanding of how those forms
constrain plaintiffs in antidiscrimination actions, see Elengold, supra note 58, at 472-74.
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claim is still likely to fail, for all of the empirical and analytical reasons stated
above.
That is not to say, however, that there are no doctrinal benefits for Julia in
pursuing her claim under antidiscrimination laws. There are, in fact, several
reasons why it makes sense for Julia to assert her claims under the FHA and/or
the North Carolina State Fair Housing Act. First, there is a benefit to telling a
standard story about a woman or a Black person who is the victim of housing
discrimination. Such a narrative, sometimes known as a “stock story,” draws on
assumed social order in our communities and world.70 In so doing, it resonates
with judges and juries because it feels consistent with what they know and
understand about how the world works, and thus seems credible.71 Second, the
antidiscrimination statutes provide comprehensive and significant remedies. If
she prevails, Julia can seek compensatory damages, punitive damages,
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees.72 Julia could recover monetary damages
for actual, compensatory, and punitive damages. Her actual damages might, for
example, include the additional amount she had to pay to rent an alternate unit,
an amount representing time lost at work due to her interactions with Bill
Herman, or an amount reflecting lost opportunity if she was forced into an
apartment farther away from work or viable public transportation. She could also
be compensated for the emotional distress she suffered. In addition to actual,
economic, or out-of-pocket costs, courts have held that successful discrimination

70

See Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
117, 122 (2002) (describing persuasive storytelling as that which “resonate[s] with the values,
beliefs and assumptions of our audience,” including such stock stories as “the heroic
firefighter, the Good Samaritan” and “pernicious stories” such as “the helpless woman victim,
the crack whore, the lascivious f*g”).
71 See DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL
CLINICAL PROGRAMS 49 (2d ed. 2002) (emphasizing importance of credibility in developing
case theory).
72 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (providing that “[i]n a civil action . . . if the court finds that a
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may award to the
plaintiff actual and punitive damages,” along with “any permanent or temporary injunction,
temporary restraining order, or other order” and “a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs”). The
same is true for other civil rights statutes. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1982) (“We
hold that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when
the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”); Probe v. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding attorneys’ fees under Title
VII); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-39 (1999) (clarifying reckless
indifference standard for punitive damages under Title VII). Although not specifically related
to Julia’s individual relief, if Julia prevails, there is a broad social and professional cost to Bill
Herman to be labeled a “racist.” It is worth considering whether such an outcome might
achieve one or more of Julia’s goals, including warning others of Bill’s malevolent intent.
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plaintiffs can recover for the “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered” due
to the discriminatory acts.73 Such awards have been significant.74
Third, the FHA’s statutory scheme offers varied avenues for Julia to seek
legal redress. Julia could file a fair housing complaint with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or the North Carolina Human
Relations Commission. The FHA’s statutory scheme affords Julia an
opportunity to file such a complaint at no initial cost to her.75 After government
investigators assess the merits of the complaint, the statutory scheme affords
Julia an opportunity to conciliate or litigate her case in an administrative court.76
She may also elect to have her case heard in federal court, whereafter she could
be named an aggrieved person in a suit against the defendant brought by the
United States, through which the federal government could seek damages on her
behalf.77 Julia, however, is not obligated to go through the administrative
process. Because the FHA does not have an administrative exhaustion
requirement, Julia could also choose to file her complaint directly in state or
federal court.78
3.

The Flexibility of Consumer Protection’s Design and Doctrine

Consumer protection law requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant
engaged in a practice related to a consumer transaction that was unfair,
deceptive, fraudulent, or that otherwise caused injury to the plaintiff. In many
states, the doctrine has developed in a way that has enhanced a plaintiff’s ability
to remedy a wide range of problematic consumer transactions.79

73 Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (directing lower court to
“award plaintiffs an amount which will fairly compensate them for [their] emotional distress,”
including “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered”); see also Littlefield v. McGuffey,
954 F.2d 1337, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming jury award of fifty thousand dollars in
compensatory damages and one hundred thousand dollars in punitive damages for race-based
discrimination); Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908
F.2d 864, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing relationship between “humiliation and
embarrassment” plaintiffs suffered and damages awarded).
74 See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 25:6
(2017).
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610.
76 See id.
77 Id. § 3614(b). This option would limit Julia’s financial costs for pursuing a claim under
the FHA. It does not, however, necessarily limit the emotional costs. And, unless Julia
intervenes as a plaintiff (and takes on the financial burden of litigating the case), under this
option, Julia loses control of the strategy and resolution of the case.
78 Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
79 There is no private right of action under the FTCA. Therefore, individual plaintiffs often
turn to state UDAP and other consumer protection laws to vindicate their rights. Because state
laws vary, it is not accurate to say that the doctrine has universally developed to enhance a
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Like all states, North Carolina has a UDAP statute,80 patterned from the
FTCA.81 When Congress passed the FTCA in 1914, the Act aimed to prevent
monopolies.82 Then, in 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Act to amend
the FTCA to cover a broader range of abusive practices, prohibiting “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices . . . .”83 In his congressional testimony prior to the
passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, then FTC Commissioner Ewin L.
Davis explained that the purpose of the amendment is:
[T]o protect the public against acts and practices injurious to the public
where no competition or injury to competitors may exist, or where
competition or injury to competitors is so obvious that the Government
should not be put to the time and expense of proving competition and injury
to competitors, or where competitors may not be entitled to protection
because of the same fraudulent character of their business.84
By the 1960s, however, critics claimed that the FTC was largely ineffective in
remedying fraud and abuse against consumers.85 The FTCA’s failure to provide
a private right of action further limited the FTC’s ability to achieve remedies for
individuals.86 In response to the consumer protection movement of the 1960s,87
plaintiff’s ability to achieve a legal remedy. See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text
(describing recovery under different state UDAP statutes).
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2018) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful.”).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).
82 See Megan Bittakis, Consumer Protection Laws: Not Just for Consumers, 13 WYO. L.
REV. 439, 442 (2013) (noting FTC’s original focus on antitrust).
83 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45); see also Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 440 (1991) (charting
evolution of FTCA).
84 To Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on S.3744 Before the S. Comm.
on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong. 19 (1936) (statement of Ewin L. Davis, Member, FTC);
see also Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC
Act”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (noting the
Wheeler-Lea Act’s legislative history “evidence[s] a clear intent that the Commission
vigorously pursue questionable trade practices that adversely affected consumers, regardless
of any resultant impact on competitive business”).
85 Sovern, supra note 83, at 442 (noting that the FTC was “harshly criticized as ineffective”
by legal community in 1960s).
86 Stephanie L. Kroeze, Note, The FTC Won’t Let Me Be: A Need for a Private Right of
Action Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 227, 231-40 (2015) (outlining
elements of federal consumer protection laws).
87 Scholars have defined the consumer protection advocacy of the 1960s as a social
movement. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and the Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
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the FTC encouraged states to adopt their own consumer protection statutes to
mimic the FTCA’s protections.88 In 1964, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws developed a model consumer protection
law as guidance for state legislatures.89 State legislatures responded, passing
statutes largely based on the FTCA that became known as “‘UDAP’ statutes, for
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’”90 or “Little FTC Acts.”91 By affording
individual consumers a private right of action, UDAP statutes filled a significant
gap in the consumer protection doctrine.92 By 1981, every state and the District
of Columbia had passed a UDAP or Little FTC Act, varying in scope, remedy,
and breadth.93 Although the North Carolina law, for instance, includes a blanket

REV. 1147, 1183 (2010) (arguing that modern consumer movement of 1960s and 1970s fits
within definition of a social movement, which includes: (1) sustained organizational effort to
effect social change, (2) consumer lawyers acting as resources, and (3) multi-prong strategy
that included law reform); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526-31 (1980) (describing
“consumer movement” in 1960s and 1970s). In fact, for some, the 1960s “might well go down
in history as the decade in which the consumers of America rose up to protect their interests
and managed to obtain some response from government.” DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN
TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 4 (1974). The movement was marked by
increased activism by the FTC and passage of federal statutory consumer protections like the
Consumer Protection Act, which included the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. (describing
Congress’s response to consumer activism); Budnitz, supra, at 1149 (pointing to TILA as
critical marker of modern consumer movement, especially because it was the first federal law
“regulating the consumer financial services industry that provided consumers with a private
right of action”).
88 Bittakis, supra note 82, at 443 (detailing efforts to encourage states to adopt analogous
laws); Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 87, at 522 (“The Commission strongly encouraged these
state-level activities, recognizing that enforcement of the Act’s broad section 5 proscription
against ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ could not possibly be accomplished without
extra-agency assistance.”).
89 Bittakis, supra note 82, at 443 (observing that model law ultimately proved “insufficient
to protect individual consumers”). In a 1970 amendment, the Council of State Governments,
in consultation with the FTC, followed up that guidance with three variations, all in an effort
to provide choices to states to craft a better fit for their needs. Id.
90 SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 97.
91 Id.; see also Sovern, supra note 83, at 446-52 (discussing details of “Little FTC Acts”).
92 Although the UDAP statutes originally limited enforcement authority to state agencies,
states passed or amended many to include a private right of action. See Sovern, supra note 83,
at 446.
93 Id.; see also Karns, supra note 84, at 388-429 (detailing various state Little FTC Acts
and their relationship to FTC’s guidance).
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exception for learned professions,94 it is otherwise a good example of a standard
state UDAP law.95 It states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful.”96
State UDAP statutes provide certain protections against unfair and deceptive
practices in the consumer context. The great majority provide a private right of
action, coupled with some combination of statutory damages, compensatory
damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees provisions.97 Those protections, in
combination, have generally been considered successful at providing consumers
a means of vindicating their rights. Professor Dee Pridgen notes that there are
some detractors of UDAP statutes, but, for the most part:
Over the years since their inception, the state UDAP statutes, with their
private rights of action, have been instrumental in achieving justice for
consumers. The litigated cases have been numerous, numbering in the
thousands each year, with some states such as Texas, Washington,
Massachusetts, and California, being particularly active. . . . In numerous
cases individual consumers have been able, thanks to the state UDAP
statutes, to gain legal representation, go to court, and be compensated for
their injury, all the while providing legal precedents and strong remedies
that are hoped to deter similar violations.98
UDAP statutes are widely considered the “bedrock protections” for
consumers against “predators and unscrupulous businesses,” and,
unsurprisingly, their effectiveness varies across states.99
The design of the consumer protection doctrine is both relatively inclusive
and flexible. Unlike the protected class orientation of the antidiscrimination
doctrine, the consumer protection doctrine focuses specifically and uniquely on
the defendant’s bad act(s). Like the FTCA,100 the great majority of UDAP

94 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2018) (“For purposes of this section, ‘commerce’ includes
all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services
rendered by a member of a learned profession.”).
95 See Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (N.C. 1981) (recognizing that language of
North Carolina UDAP law tracks relevant section of FTCA, but adds private right of action).
96 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a).
97 See Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Evaluation of
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 1, 9 (Mar. 2018),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/98TM-K5QG].
98 Pridgen, supra note 9, at 290; see also Pridgen, supra note 20, at 911 (“The state UDAP
laws were initially somewhat slow to be invoked, but their enforcement has now reached a
level of maturity and strength that is quite impressive.”).
99 Carter, supra note 97, at 9.
100 In the FTCA, Congress explicitly chose to avoid defining or detailing what would
constitute “unfair or deceptive” practices, leaving it up to the FTC to develop guidance. S.
REP. NO. 597, at 13 (1914) (“The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
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statutes include broad, general prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts.101
State courts look to federal guidance to define “unfair” and “deceptive.” The
2010 Dodd-Frank legislation, for example, set forth a test for establishing
“unfair” practices, defining such to require: “(1) substantial consumer injury
(which can be by small injury to many consumers), (2) that is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers, and (3) that is not outweighed by benefits to consumers
and competition.”102 Federal law traditionally defined the term “deceptive” to
require: “(1) a trade practice deemed to have a tendency or capacity to deceive;
(2) the potential to deceive a member or members of the audience targeted by
the trade practice; and (3) a requirement that the practice be material with respect
to a consumer’s purchase decision.”103 In 1981, the FTC issued a Deception
Policy Statement, which, while criticized,104 has universally reshaped the

whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in
commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were
unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better, for the reason, as stated by one
of the representatives of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, that there were too many
unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible
to invent others.”); H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (“It is impossible to frame
definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in
this field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would
be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition,
it would undertake an endless task. It is also practically impossible to define unfair practices
so that the definition will fit business of every sort in every part of this country.”); Bittakis,
supra note 82, at 442 (“Rather than trying to describe every possible unfair and deceptive
trade practice, Congress left the power of determining what constitutes such trade practices
to the FTC.”).
101 Carter, supra note 97, at 12-14 (identifying forty-five states and District of Columbia
with statutes that include broad substantive protections against deceptive practices and thirtynine states and District of Columbia with broad protections against unfair practices).
102 Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 125 (2012) (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1031(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012)).
The FTC also issued a similar 1980 Unfairness Statement, which stated: “To justify a finding
of unfairness the [consumer] injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not
be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice
produces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have
avoided.” Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product
Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer
Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 282-83 (2000) (quoting FTC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON
CONSUMER UNFAIRNESS JURISDICTION (1980), reprinted in Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070
app. (1984)).
103 Karns, supra note 84, at 381 (footnotes omitted).
104 See id. at 386 (“Congress rejected the report as biased and non-neutral.”).
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definition of deception.105 Based on that statement, the FTC defines “an act or
practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that,
second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is
material.”106 Most state UDAP statutes provide a private right of action for
individuals victimized by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in a consumer
transaction.107 Because the focus of a consumer protection claim is the
defendant’s bad act(s) wholly unconnected to the plaintiff’s identity or
membership in a particular group, the design of the consumer protection statutes
is more inclusive and flexible than that of the antidiscrimination statutes.
4.

The Benefits and Risks of the Consumer Protection Claim

Now return to Julia’s case. To make a claim under North Carolina’s UDAP
statute, Julia would need to show that Bill engaged in an unfair or deceptive act
or practice that affected commerce and proximately caused Julia’s injury.108 In
contrast to Julia’s discrimination claim, the UDAP statute affords Julia several
benefits.109
The first benefit is Julia’s likelihood of success on the claim. State UDAP
statutes can protect against discriminatory actions like those Julia faced.110 In

105

See id. at 388-89 (detailing deference given to policy statement).
Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984); see also Braucher, supra note 102, at
125 (detailing influence of FTC Statement on Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
107 Carter, supra note 97, at 53-65 (cataloging and assessing private rights of action under
state UDAP statutes).
108 Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d, 597
S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (mem.) (“The necessary elements for a claim under [N.C. GEN. STAT.]
§ 75-1.1 are: ‘(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, which
(3) proximately caused actual injury to the claimnant.’” (citing Boyce & Isley, PLLC v.
Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002))). This is consistent with other state UDAP
laws. See, e.g., Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002)
(construing Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 505/1 to /12 to require: “(1) a deceptive or unfair act or practice by the defendant; (2)
the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the
deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce”).
109 At the most basic level, state UDAP statutes have a broader scope than
antidiscrimination statutes. Deanne Loonin, Race Discrimination and Consumer Law: What
Legal Services Can Do to Attain Justice in the Marketplace, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 47, 50
(2002) (noting strengths of UDAP statutes for challenging discrimination).
110 See, e.g., Sager v. Hous. Comm’n, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 568 (D. Md. 2012) (allowing
plaintiff’s claim under Maryland Consumer Protection Act to proceed based on allegations
that defendant housing authority induced plaintiff to sign “vacate agreement” for her
subsidized housing); Anast v. Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 802 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
106
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fact, Julia can point to two separate acts that likely violated the UDAP statute.
First, Bill misrepresented the availability of the two-bedroom apartment to Julia,
a potential consumer. Second, Bill quoted Julia a price that was too high for the
alternate one-bedroom apartment.111 Julia prevails if she can prove that either
one or both of those acts were either unfair or deceptive. There is a good
argument that both acts are unfair and deceptive under the definitions set forth
above.112 The misrepresentations were unfair because Bill used information
available only to him, to which Julia could not be privy, in order to deny her
access to housing.113 And misrepresentations or omissions of material facts are
sufficient to prove deception.114 In fact, false advertising—promising a
consumer a product or price and then failing to deliver on that promise—is one
of the most recognized forms of unfair or deceptive practices.115

Business Practices Act claim based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendant evicted her from
apartment in violation of lease requirements).
111 This is clear because he quoted Julia a higher price for the one-bedroom ($800) than
had been advertised for the two-bedroom ($750) and than he quoted to George ($650).
112 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (detailing what constitutes unfairness
or deceptive practices and acts).
113 See Supplee v. Miller-Motte Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(noting “party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct which amounts
to an inequitable assertion of its power of privilege” (quoting McInerney v. Pinehurst Area
Realty, Inc., 590 S.E.2d 313, 316-17 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004))).
114 There are potential factual anomalies here that could make Bill’s statements true or
otherwise not misrepresentations. But if they are misrepresentations, Julia would not need to
show improper motivation connected to her protected class; she would need only prove
misrepresentation to satisfy that prong of the UDAP claim. See Krebs v. Charlotte Sch. of
Law, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00190, 2017 WL 3880667, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2017)
(declining to dismiss class plaintiffs’ UDAP claim against defendant based on
misrepresentations made about school’s accreditation and other misleading information to
students, and recognizing that “North Carolina courts have traditionally applied this statute
liberally, including claims involving negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose
material information”); Kron Med. Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assocs., Inc., 420 S.E.2d 192,
196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding failure to disclose information tantamount to
misrepresentation and thus unfair or deceptive practice in violation of North Carolina’s
UDAP); Haigh v. Superior Ins. Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-02582, 2017 WL 4848154, at *4
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017) (holding plaintiffs adequately pleaded North Carolina UDAP
claim based on defendant’s failure to disclose hidden commissions). North Carolina courts
have found “sufficient aggravating circumstances” in cases involving “forgery or deception.”
Chapel H.O.M. Assocs., LLC v. RME Mgmt., LLC, 808 S.E.2d 576, 579 (N.C. Ct. App.
2017) (collecting cases). If Bill’s statements were not misrepresentations, Julia may not have
a successful UDAP case. The purpose of this exercise is not, however, to litigate Julia’s claim.
Rather, it is to set forth a factual scenario that allows courts, practitioners, and scholars to
consider the benefits or detriments of one claim compared to the other.
115 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“The inadequacy of common law tools with
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Of course, Bill could defend against Julia’s UDAP and FHA claims by
proving that his statements were not, in fact, misrepresentations. Julia must
establish the elements of either the antidiscrimination or consumer protection
claim. The difference between proving the two claims is that the
antidiscrimination claim requires an extra step—proving that Bill made the
misrepresentation because of Julia’s membership in a protected class and
subclass. The consumer protection claim requires only that Julia prove the
misrepresentation itself. At the most basic level, the antidiscrimination claim
requires an additional element. To prove a discrimination claim, Julia must
prove A (misrepresentation) + B (intent); to prove a consumer protection claim,
Julia must only prove A (misrepresentation).116 State UDAP statutes, patterned
from the FTCA, “eliminated the need to prove intent to deceive, and justifiable
reliance.”117 Because Julia needs only prove Bill’s bad actions, she is
unburdened by the demands of proof and persuasion that accompany the added
element of intent.118 This is particularly salient for Julia because her identity as
a Black woman would complicate her effort to attain a remedy under
antidiscrimination law, but not under consumer protection law.
In addition to establishing that the act was unfair or deceptive, Julia must
show that she was injured by the misrepresentation(s). Julia has strong
arguments that she was so injured.119 Julia could argue that she lost time
responding to the advertisement stating that a two-bedroom was available. She
may have given up an opportunity at another apartment or lost hours at work.
She may have had costs associated with transportation. She may be forced to
pay more somewhere else because she missed the beginning of the month or a
special deal. She may be forced to either pay more for a smaller apartment,
causing financial and emotional stress, or move to a different area, perhaps one
without access to a grocery store or quality public transportation.
The second benefit of Julia’s UDAP claim is the possibility of recovering
significant money damages based on those injuries. State UDAP statutes
generally give consumers a private right of action to seek compensatory
damages, an injunction against the fraudulent practices, and, in most states,

which a consumer could address false advertising and deceitful commercial schemes in some
circumstances eventually led Congress in 1914 to establish the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and empower it to regulate such conduct.”).
116 Compare Clarke, supra note 42, at 109-41 (discussing how courts interpret elements of
antidiscrimination statutes), with Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368
(N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d, 597 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (mem.) (listing elements of consumer
protection claim under North Carolina UDAP statute).
117 Pridgen, supra note 20, at 918.
118 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing proof issues in intentional
discrimination claims).
119 See supra Section I.B.2 (assessing Julia’s claims).
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attorneys’ fees.120 While some state statutes limit recovery to unfair or deceptive
practices that negatively affect the community at large,121 all state statutes permit
compensatory relief,122 and twenty-five state statutes permit consumers to
recover double and treble damages.123 Seven states that do not authorize multiple
damages do authorize punitive damages for UDAP violations.124 Although the
ability to recover for emotional distress damages in antidiscrimination cases is a
clear advantage, some UDAP statutes also permit recovery for mental anguish,
physical pain and suffering, or consequential damages.125 In Delaware, for
example, a plaintiff was able to recover consequential damages in the amount of
lost profits from the nursing home he had planned to operate on purchased real
estate where the defendant omitted that the property was subject to imminent
foreclosure.126 In North Carolina, if successful on her UDAP claim, Julia would
be entitled to treble damages for her injuries and may be eligible to recover
attorneys’ fees.127 She may also be able to recover for emotional distress
damages.128 Depending on how well Julia connected the loss of this apartment
to greater opportunity and employment, her damages may be extensive.
Third, litigating a UDAP claim in state court would be less expensive and less
emotionally taxing than litigating an antidiscrimination claim in federal court. A
state claim would more quickly move through the court system, offering Julia a
more efficient means of exercising her rights. Because she need only prove that
Bill lied to her, a fact that she could establish through her own testimony and
120

Carter, supra note 97, at 35 (noting only five state UDAP statutes—Arizona, Delaware,
Mississippi, South Dakota, and Wymoing—lack attorneys’ fees provision).
121 Id. at 39 (noting Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina,
and Washington UDAP statutes impose community impact limitation).
122 Id. at 33.
123 Id. at 42-43.
124 Id. at 44 (listing California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, and
Rhode Island).
125 Michael C. Bruck, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection:
Damages in UDAP Claims 23, 28 (July 25-Aug. 1, 2015) (unpublished presentation) (on file
with author) (“A plaintiff’s allegations of aggravation, inconvenience, mental anguish, and
emotional distress suffered as a result of Defendant’s conduct are sufficient to plead
damages.”).
126 Nash v. Hoopes, 332 A.2d 411, 414 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (calculating damages).
127 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2018). The North Carolina statute requires treble damages
in successful suits. Id. (“[I]f damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.”
(emphasis added)). Attorneys’ fees are awarded in North Carolina at the judge’s discretion
and only upon a finding that the charged party “willfully engaged” in the prohibited activity.
Id. § 75-16.1.
128 Williams v. HomEq Servicing Corp., 646 S.E.2d 381, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(recognizing that emotional distress damages are available under chapter 75 of North Carolina
code).
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testimony from George Simon, Julia may be able to avoid time-consuming and
expensive discovery. And because she would not need to plead and prove her
identity, Bill’s intent to discriminate because of her identity, or emotional
distress connected to the intentional discrimination,129 Julia may be spared
painful and invasive discovery. Finally, it is possible that, by choosing not to
assert discrimination, Julia may escape the bias and unfair treatment that many
discrimination plaintiffs face from judges and juries. To be sure, data suggests
that women and people of color face discrimination in judgments whether or not
they explicitly allege gender or race discrimination.130 Telling a universal story
that could happen to any consumer, however, may offer a point of connection
between Julia and the factfinder, interrupting the factfinder’s implicit or explicit
biases.131
Unsurprisingly, Julia’s UDAP claim also comes with risks and drawbacks. To
begin, there are process concerns. State courts operate more informally and with
less process than federal courts.132 In fact, state courts around the country have
been criticized for failing to consistently apply rules of civil procedure and for
pushing parties to settle.133 State court juries also tend to award lower judgments
than federal court juries.134 State court claims allow for less, or less formal,
discovery, and have more pro se litigants.135 Although those considerations are
129

Of course, if Julia seeks emotional distress damages or seeks to connect Bill’s bad acts
to racist or other bias-oriented motivations, she will open herself up to some of the same
downsides that accompany a discrimination claim. She will not, however, have to prove intent
or motivation to prevail on her UDAP claim.
130 See sources cited supra note 57 (detailing judge and jury bias in gender and race
discrimination cases).
131 Such an approach is not without concern. Part III takes up that analysis more fully.
132 See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395 (1992) (identifying
four “main rationales at work in forum selection”: (1) fears about state court’s biases or
competence, (2) concern about pace and/or cost of litigating the action, (3) use of procedure
to browbeat opponent into settlement or gain some other tactical advantage, and (4)
convenience for the attorney). Professor Miller’s study shows different assessments of costs
and benefits for state and federal court practice depending on whether the attorney was a
defense- or plaintiff-side attorney. Id. at 400.
133 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1872 (2008) (detailing
how advocates for the Class Action Fairness Act described state courts as “less careful” and
as “‘lax’ tribunals that applied the rules of law ‘inconsistently’” than federal courts (footnotes
omitted)); cf. Sovern, supra note 83, at 458 (identifying small claims court venue as drawback
to UDAP claim due to lack of uniform commitment to integrity of federal and state courts).
134 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A
Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 434 (1996) (finding, in part, that jury “award
levels are much higher in federal court than in state court”).
135 See, e.g., Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The
Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving
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not per se negative, they do increase uncertainty and risk associated with
litigation.
There are also normative concerns. Pursuing a UDAP claim places Julia’s
injury in the realm of a negative consumer transaction. It does not offer Julia an
opportunity to connect her injury to historic and systemic discrimination against
Blacks, women, or Black women in America. This Article takes up that
normative analysis in Part III, below.
Finally, there are doctrinal concerns that extend beyond Julia’s individual
story. Specifically, there are concerns that the patchwork state laws are or will
become ineffectual to achieve remedies for plaintiffs like Julia. A micro analysis
suggests risks to relying on consumer protection to remedy certain civil rights
violations. State UDAP statutes vary and some have fewer protections than
others. For example, state courts in Michigan and Rhode Island have interpreted
their state UDAP provisions very narrowly, leaving fewer covered
transactions.136 State UDAP statutes in Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South
Dakota, and Wyoming prohibit successful plaintiffs from recovering attorneys’
fees, making it financially challenging for consumers to take advantage of the
protections.137 And in Alaska, the UDAP statute requires unsuccessful
consumers to pay attorneys’ fees to the business they sued.138 Patchwork state
UDAP statutes lead to unequal treatment for individual victims of consumer
protection violations across states and confused messaging to goods and service
providers about what is acceptable and unacceptable consumer-related practice.
A macro analysis also highlights the risk of turning to consumer protection to
remedy certain civil rights violations. Historically, as set forth below, lawmakers
and the courts have narrowed civil rights protections generally and with respect

Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 187 (2012) (recognizing that
“[t]he pro se phenomenon had the harshest effect on courts hearing family law matters,” which
take place in state courts).
136 See Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 28, 38 (Mich. 1999) (exempting any
business activity already subject to regulation from the Michigan Consumer Protection Act);
Carter, supra note 97, at 1 (“UDAP protections in Michigan and Rhode Island—the ‘terrible
two’—have been gutted by court decisions that interpret the statute as being applicable to
almost no consumer transactions. These decisions were issued over ten years ago, yet the state
legislatures still have not corrected them.”).
137 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (2018)
(allowing attorneys’ fees for defendants but not plaintiffs); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31
(2018) (“Any person who claims to have been adversely affected by any act or a practice
declared to be unlawful . . . shall be permitted to bring a civil action for the recovery of actual
damages suffered as a result . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2017) (authorizing
attorneys’ fees only for class actions); Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 521
P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ariz. 1974) (finding no right to recover attorneys’ fees under Arizona UDAP
statute).
138 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(c) (2017) (“[I]f the plaintiff is not the prevailing
party . . . the court shall award a prevailing defendant . . . full reasonable attorney fees.”).
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to economic justice specifically.139 There is a risk that, by using consumer
protection to achieve antidiscrimination or race-based goals, politicians and
judges will similarly narrow consumer protection law’s flexibility and reach. It
is only because of the narrow and rigid interpretation of civil rights statutes—
law specifically designed to address group-based discrimination—that this
Article and its analysis becomes necessary and important. It is conceivable that
the same fate would befall the consumer protection doctrine.140
II.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Before exploring the normative trade-offs inherent in choosing consumer
protection or antidiscrimination law to remedy traditional civil rights violations,
this Part briefly sets out the historical development of the current
antidiscrimination doctrine.141 It does so to provide context for the normative
analysis. One must wrestle with two observations to engage fully in the
normative discussion. First, that historically, civil rights advocates understood
economic citizenship as a core component of robust civil rights protections. And
second, that antidiscrimination law has developed narrowly, severing the
relationship between economic rights and civil rights, and otherwise
constraining the ability of those laws to achieve anti-subordination and groupbased equality goals. This Article argues that these observations lead to dual
conclusions. First, that by ignoring the import of economic citizenship and
narrowly constraining its protections, civil rights laws designed to remedy and
prevent race-based and other group-based discrimination have betrayed at least
part of their original aims. And second, that because economic citizenship is
inextricable from political and social citizenship, promoting full and fair access
to consumer systems will advance the group-based equality goals of historic
civil rights movements.
A.

The Relationship Between Economic Citizenship and Civil Rights

Throughout American history, civil rights movements and advocacy have
promoted economic citizenship as a key component of civil rights. In the wake
of the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, advocates pushed for land grants
and a robust Freedman’s Bureau to support economic citizenship for recently139

See infra Section II.B (discussing civil rights history).
In fact, due in part to the strength and flexibility of the UDAP statutes, they have
recently been subject to criticism and challenges. See Pridgen, supra note 20, at 937-41
(detailing and rebutting varied critiques of state UDAP laws and their robust enforcement).
141 This Article merely skims the surface of a rich and complex history, borrowing from
historians and legal historians who have contributed immensely to the scholarly literature. For
a more complete picture of the development of civil rights and antidiscrimination law, see
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014);
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011).
140
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freed Blacks.142 As far back as 1865, the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment
sought not just to abolish slavery, but to promote a broader understanding of
economic citizenship.143 They envisioned “free labor” as “not just the absence
of slavery and its vestiges,” but also “the guarantee of an affirmative state of
labor autonomy,” which were delineated by “specific freedoms that were the
inalienable prerogatives of the working man.”144 In fact, in the 1940s and 1950s,
civil rights lawyers at the U.S. Department of Justice turned to the Thirteenth
Amendment to seek legal redress for various kinds of legal and economic
coercion.145
The New Deal civil rights movement, developed and led by industrial labor
unions, also recognized the relationship between social and economic
citizenship.146 Advocates fought for the right to work, the right to a livelihood,
and the right to social insurance, connecting those measures of economic
independence to full democratic participation.147
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s similarly recognized the
import of economic justice in the fight for civil rights. Although the popular
conception of that movement is a fight for formal equality,148 a deeper study of
the civil rights movement reveals that many civil rights advocates and activists
shared a deep and abiding belief that economic access, economic justice, and

142 MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 17-23 (2017).
143 The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and prohibited involuntary servitude.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
144 Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 305, 308 (1988); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438-39 (1989) (citing E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11 (1970)).
145 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1614 (2001) (“In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, Civil Rights
Section lawyers came to use the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for instituting ‘free
labor,’ broadly defined, and for prohibiting various kinds of legal and economic coercion.”).
146 Forbath, supra note 10, at 697 (tracing historical development of union-based New
Deal civil rights movement and connecting it to church-based civil rights movement of
1960s).
147 Id. at 698 (“Along with the right to work and a right to livelihood went a right to social
insurance and a right to a measure of economic independence and democracy.”).
148 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2700-01 (arguing that Professor Ackerman’s
influential volume “privileges the formal lawmaking process and popular consensus” and fails
to honor “formal and informal influences on lawmaking, moments of consensus and contest,
and federally ratified and locally sanctioned dimensions of the socio-legal agenda established
during the civil rights era” (citing ACKERMAN, supra note 141, at 3-4, 5-7)).
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economic citizenship are critical to the fight for civil rights.149 Movement
leaders, including Ella Baker, A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, and the
leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”), pushed
for universal economic citizenship to sit at the forefront of the movement’s
platform.150 They sought income guarantees, significant government investment
in poor communities, and a right to housing.151 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
recognized that the “inseparable twin of racial injustice was economic
injustice”152 and joined the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in
Chicago to lead housing marches, end slums, increase the minimum wage, and
eradicate mortgage and loan discrimination.153 From Dr. King’s choice to frame
his famous “I Have a Dream” speech around the metaphor of a bank default154

149 It has been suggested, in fact, that the fight against Jim Crow segregation was
complementary, but secondary, to the fight for economic citizenship. Brown-Nagin, supra
note 10, at 2714-15 (“From the bottom up, the labor roots of the movement and the struggle
for economic equality are clear. The struggle against Jim Crow laws unrelated to economic
rights is important but not dominant.”). Economic citizenship is not, of course, the only facet
of the civil rights movement that has faded from the national narrative. The role of Black
feminists, for example, has also been lost in the dominant narrative of the civil rights
movement. See, e.g., Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political
Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1252 (2005) (“[V]irtually nothing in the dominant
narrative would lead us to expect an image of the [1963 March on Washington] that showed
women carrying signs demanding jobs for all, decent housing, fair pay, and equal rights
‘NOW!’, thus asserting both their racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers
and thereby equals of men.”).
150 Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2711 (“[Advocates in the civil rights movement]
pushed Dr. King and lawmakers to pursue a progressive agenda of economic citizenship for
all more quickly.”).
151 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 3-4 (discussing how activists believed racial and economic
justice were “indissoluble”).
152 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM, THE MONTGOMERY STORY 69
(1958).
153 50 Years Ago: MLK Jr.’s Speech at Soldier Field, March to City Hall with Demands
for Daley, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 10, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctmartin-luther-king-jr-1966-speech-chicago-20160706-story.html
[https://perma.cc/L5XJNQLZ] (“The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, then led by King, targeted Chicago
‘due to high levels of institutionalized discrimination’ in schools and housing. Mortgage and
loan discrimination, tenants rights, quality education and job access were among the goals.”);
Linda Lutton, Fifty Years Ago Today, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Got a Chicago Address,
WBEZ NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/fifty-years-agotoday-dr-martin-luther-king-jr-gets-a-chicago-address/b9534b2d-cc7f-4e34-ab59c024cbd5aa3b [https://perma.cc/57U2-SVEK] (“The dream King talked about in Chicago
included a 60 percent increase to the minimum wage.”).
154 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington
D.C. 1-2 (Aug. 28, 1963), https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2H5-MAUN] (calling out America for “default[ing] on this promissory
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to his call for full, fair, and equal access to credit and consumer markets at his
speech at Soldier Field,155 the connection between economic justice and racial
justice can be traced throughout the civil rights movement.
In fact, consumer spaces were the nerve center and consumption tool of the
movement’s non-violent protest.156 Blacks in Atlanta, Greensboro,
Montgomery, Selma, and across the South took a stand against Jim Crow
segregation at bus stops, lunch counters, motels, and retail institutions. When
direct action turned violent, rioters targeted stores that had treated them unfairly
and destroyed ledgers documenting oppressive debt.157 Opponents of the civil
rights movement also used consumer spaces to fight back against the movement.
Segregationists fought integration and access to the ballot box by firing workers,
denying Blacks public assistance, and withdrawing necessary credit and supplies
for Black-run farms and businesses.158 The latter struck at the heart of the Black
community’s access to consumer culture, financial markets, and wealth
development.159
Today’s civil rights advocates continue to recognize the relationship between
economic citizenship and full and fair participation in our democracy. The Black
note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. . . . America has given the Negro people a
bad check, a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds’”); see also BARADARAN,
supra note 142, at 140 (“King, who chose his words carefully, was asking for a financial
reckoning.”).
155 50 Years Ago, supra note 153; Lutton, supra note 153.
156 See Martin Luther King, Jr., I’ve Been to the Mountaintop, Memphis, TN (Apr. 3,
1968), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/ive-been-mountaintop-addre
ss-delivered-bishop-charles-mason-temple [https://perma.cc/L62V-U2YD] (identifying
economic action as tool of liberation and counseling followers to “anchor our external direct
action with the power of economic withdrawal”). That is not to say that access to consumer
spaces was the objective; rather, it was the means of demanding dignity. But, just as access to
lunch counters was a symbol of full and free economic and democratic citizenship in the
1960s, analogous access to economic and consumer spaces is equally as symbolic today.
157 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 143-44 (“Looters destroyed the leather-bound books
on which their debts were recorded before they destroyed anything else.”); see also Anne
Fleming, Remaking the “Law of the Poor”: Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.
(1965), in THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING THE MAJOR CASES 32, 32 (Marie A.
Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (pointing to study of uprisings in American urban centers
in mid-1960s concluding that “city residents had ‘[s]ignificant grievances concerning unfair
commercial practices’” (alteration in original) (citing UNITED STATES KERNER COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274, 276 (1968))).
158 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 13 (“[W]hen politicians and business elites mobilized
massive resistance to southern desegregation and voter registration campaigns, thousands of
rights activists faced job loss, eviction, coordinated denial of public assistance, and loss of
credit and supplies crucial to their farms and businesses.”).
159 The White Citizens’ Council in Alabama, for example, warned integrationists that they
would register their opposition by making it impossible “to find and hold a job, get credit or
renew a mortgage.” Id. at 56.
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Lives Matter movement’s platform, for example, includes a call for economic
justice, demanding “economic justice for all,” defined as “collective ownership”
of the same economic systems that sat at the heart of the earlier civil rights
movements, including labor markets, housing markets, and credit markets.160
B.

The Failures of Implementation

The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, the labor organizers of the New
Deal civil rights movement, the original lawyers of the DOJ’s Civil Rights
Division, the leaders of the 1960s civil rights movement, and the platform
developers of the Black Lives Matter movement all recognized the relationship
between economic citizenship and full and free participation in a democratic
society. Yet, in response to each of these movements in American civil rights
history, the protections developed in a way that dissociated economic citizenship
from group-based political and social citizenship. Rather, the doctrines
developed narrowly, by focusing on formal equality and compromising the laws’
ability to realize comprehensive group-based equality goals.
Political pressures led to the collapse of the Freedman’s Bureau and the
promise of land grants, exchanging real economic citizenship for the grant of
formal political rights.161 And as labor and employment law developed, it did so
without the broad conceptions of free labor discussed and debated by the framers
of the Thirteenth Amendment.162 Although scholars have pointed to the framers’
broad conception of rights under the Thirteenth Amendment as a possible legal
springboard for achieving anti-subordination principles,163 the doctrine, as
160 Economic Justice, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/
economic-justice/ [https://perma.cc/3GCD-B4ZU] (last visited Feb. 19, 2019); Platform, THE
MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc
/Z6J9-L8EQ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
161 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 22 (referencing W.E.B. DuBois’s comment that “the
Freedman’s Bureau died, and its child was the Fifteenth Amendment”).
162 VanderVelde, supra note 144, at 498 (“Less than a decade after Reconstruction,
however, influential treatises that codified the common law of master and servant virtually
ignored these developments. As a result, the common law evolved without regard for the
constitutional tradition of free labor; and that same common law has remained the law of
employment relations in many states for most of this century.”).
163
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 258-59 (2010) (“Since then, members of Congress enforcing the
Thirteenth Amendment have relied on an anti-subordination model of equality, based not
solely on equal treatment, but instead recognizing that both racial equality and economic
rights are necessary for true equality. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress
the authority to go beyond formal equality and remedy the socioeconomic disparities
associated with race and gender that plagues our nation.”); see also William M. Carter, Jr.,
Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2007) (“Despite its seemingly simple command that
‘[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,’ the
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developed, is unprepared to answer such a call. Due to inaction by Congress and
deference to that inaction by the courts, the Thirteenth Amendment doctrine has
developed narrowly.164 Courts have consistently held that the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibitions are limited to “conditions of literal slavery or
involuntary servitude.”165
And while the laborers of the New Deal movement made the (sometimes
tension-filled) connection between racial justice and economic justice,166 the
politicians effectively erased it. Lawmakers responded to the New Deal civil
rights movement’s call for labor and economic rights by excluding Southern
labor markets from its legal protections.167 This political maneuvering
effectively omitted African Americans from the protections of the Social
Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.168 By excluding agricultural and
domestic workers from the protections of those Acts, Congress excised
economic action from racial justice, forestalling and limiting wealth
development in African American communities, while simultaneously creating
protections and opportunities for wealth development in White communities.169
Thirteenth Amendment’s scope remains ambiguous.”); Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of
Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 97-98 (1994) (arguing that environmental
degradation of Black communities is a remnant of slavery).
164 Carter, Jr., supra note 163, at 1315 (“In the absence of a definitive statement from the
Court, lower courts have uniformly held that the judicial power to enforce the Amendment is
limited to conditions of literal slavery or involuntary servitude.”).
165 Id.
166 Forbath, supra note 10, at 702 (“By the late thirties the black vote was ‘important and
sometimes decisive’ in scores of Northern congressional districts, and black workers had
become a significant part of the nation’s industrial work force. With the birth of the CIO, a
new national labor organization welcomed black workers. During the 1930s blacks were
central to union organizing throughout the nation—in southern metal and coal mining,
longshore, and tobacco manufacturing as well as in northern auto, steel, and meatpacking.
Equal rights for black workers was a defining demand of the new CIO, and friend and foe
alike agreed that the new industrial unions would not have prevailed without the militant
support they won from blacks.”).
167 Id. at 699 (describing how Southern Democrats allied with Northern Republicans to
“strip[] the main pieces of New Deal legislation of any design or provision that threatened the
separate Southern labor market and its distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its
racial segmentation, and its low wages”); Goluboff, supra note 145, at 1678 (recognizing
political compromise of New Deal legislation that left African Americans out of New Deal
legislative protections).
168 Forbath, supra note 10, at 700-01; Goluboff, supra note 145, at 1678; William M.
Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1,
5 (2012).
169 Wiecek, supra note 168, at 5 (“Because they could not collect old-age or unemployment
benefits, field hands, sharecroppers, maids, and nannies—constituting the bulk of the black
labor force in the New Deal South—were shut out from even the most modest opportunity
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Lawmakers scuttled the New Deal movement’s attempts to enact a right to a
“job for all who can work” and the “right to seek work without
discrimination.”170 At the same time, New Deal bank reforms were subject to
federal support and governance of FHA and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance, which were largely unavailable to Black banks
in primarily Black neighborhoods.171 These political actions enlarged the racial
gap in wealth development, and thus, the racial gap in economic citizenship.172
Like the New Deal legislative accomplishments, the civil rights movement of
the 1960s led to significant legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1968 FHA.173 Each prohibits
discrimination in accessing certain areas of national life: public
accommodations, public institutions, employment, education, housing, and
voting. Although the historic statutes made great strides in granting formal legal
rights, they failed to address, in any meaningful way, the economic citizenship
component of the movement’s platform.174 An excerpt from the legislative
history of the FHA is symbolic.175 Senator Walter Mondale, of the Senate
that whites enjoyed for wealth accumulation and survival assistance in economic
downturns.”).
170 Forbath, supra note 10, at 705.
171 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 123 (“Certainly, under the state-by-state chartering
regime, black banks had been denied charters as a result of discrimination, but under the new
regime black banks rarely had enough capital to obtain charters. Black banks were almost
categorically too weak to be granted FDIC insurance.”).
172 Id. at 101 (“The bulk of the New Deal reforms can accurately be described as ‘white
affirmative action’ because state resources were used to provide direct financial advantages
to white Americans at the expense of other racial groups.”).
173 ACKERMAN, supra note 141, at 11-19 (defining these three pieces of legislation as “civil
rights canon”). Legal scholars and historians have challenged the idea that the civil rights
movement, or even the civil rights canon, is limited to the battles fought and won in the 1950s
and 1960s. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2711; Forbath, supra note 10, at 697 (arguing
that civil rights movement of 1950s and 1960s “had many roots in the labor movement of the
1930s and 1940s”); Hall, supra note 149, at 1235 (identifying and describing how the “‘long
civil rights movement’ that took root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was
intimately tied to the ‘rise and fall of the New Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II,
stretched far beyond the South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and in the 1960s
and 1970s inspired a ‘movement of movements’ that ‘def[ies] any narrative of collapse’”
(footnote omitted)).
174 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 13 (“One of the movement’s greatest challenges stemmed
from a dilemma of political and economic disempowerment.”). There is also a compelling
argument that the civil rights legislation does little, if anything, to address the civil rights
movement’s goal of public integrity for the Black community, another of the movement’s
major platform positions. See Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 154, at 1.
175 This Part focuses on the FHA because it forms the basis of Julia’s civil rights claim.
Similar sentiments highlighting equal access to programs can be found in the legislative
history of other civil rights legislation. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REC. 12044, 12102 (1963)

2019]

CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

627

Committee on Banking and Currency, explained the limitations of the “fair
housing bill” to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs:
For some weeks now this subcommittee has been engaged in many efforts
to try to deal with some of the housing problems in American ghettos. I
believe that the proposal for fair housing which we begin to deal with today
is a part of that effort.
...
. . . We must show that we don’t intend to live separately in this
country but that we intend to live together.
. . . [This measure] does not purport to end the ghetto by itself. But it
would establish a legal climate under which the abolition of the ghetto
could be achieved. It would then be the law of economics, not civil rights,
which would determine who buys what house and who escapes the
ghetto.176
Leaders in the civil rights movement fought for access to economic systems,
and yet those action items are conspicuously absent from the antidiscrimination
civil rights canon.177
As the statutes and doctrines responded to these civil rights moments in
American history, economic protections were excised from “traditional” civil
rights protections based on protected classes. Congress omitted economic
citizenship rights from antidiscrimination legislation and the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that economic rights are fundamental.178 As an example, one
need only look to the weakness of the FHA’s requirement to affirmatively
further fair housing. The statute requires that “[a]ll executive departments and
(containing Senator Philip Hart’s speech in support of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
in which he applauded the legislation’s recognition that the United States is “a Nation that
treats all its people with equal hand and equal justice, and does not have one window marked
‘white’ and another window marked ‘colored,’ in order that taxpayers, white and colored
alike, may participate in Federal programs”).
176 Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearing on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.
2 (1967) (statement of Sen. Mondale, S. Comm. on Banking and Currency).
177 Professor Mehrsa Baradaran makes a strong case that, instead of investing in the idea
of economic citizenship, every administration since the Nixon Administration has instead
relied on the idea of Black banking and Black capitalism to solve the economic crisis related
to race. BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 1-2. She further argues, backed by significant
historical data and analysis, that “Black banking has been an anemic response to racial
inequality that has yielded virtually nothing in closing the wealth gap.” Id. at 2.
178 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (declining to find substantive right
to welfare benefits and applying rational basis review to restrictions on those benefits);
Zietlow, supra note 163, at 258 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 29-39 (1973) (declining to find fundamental right to education in rejecting challenge to
property tax-based funding of public schools)).

628

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:587

agencies . . . administer their programs and activities relating to housing and
urban development . . . in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes [of the
FHA].”179 Although HUD released its rule providing guidance on the Act’s
requirement to affirmatively further fair housing in 2015 (forty-seven years after
the Act’s passage),180 the general consensus is that the requirement to
affirmatively further fair housing has had little effect on segregation, housing
discrimination, or the ability of African Americans to develop property and
wealth through home ownership.181 And before the rule could make any inroads
into changing those outcomes, the Trump Administration, under the leadership
of HUD Secretary Ben Carson, has delayed its implementation182 and aggressive
enforcement appears unlikely.183

179

42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012).
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42271, 42371 (Aug. 17, 2015)
(“[A public housing agency] must establish . . . that it has complied with fair housing and civil
rights laws and regulations, or has remedied violations of fair housing and civil rights laws
and regulations, and has adopted policies and undertaken actions to affirmatively further fair
housing.”).
181 See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart: How the Government Betrayed a
Landmark Civil Rights Law, PROPUBLICA (June 25, 2015, 1:26 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-the-government-betrayed-a-landmarkcivil-rights-law [https://perma.cc/YYJ8-8JWL] (“Perhaps the starkest measure of the law’s
squandered potential is how little the torrent of federal dollars released by its passage has done
to integrate U.S. communities.”); Shanna L. Smith, Incorporating Fair Housing into
Affordable Housing Policy and Programs, J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L., Winter
2011, at 235, 235-36 (“Congress made clear its intent that the Fair Housing Act have two
goals: to eliminate housing discrimination and to promote residential integration. Both goals
have been virtually ignored by the federal government. In subsequent appropriations bills,
Congress included a requirement that recipients of federal dollars must ‘affirmatively further
fair housing.’ However, most recipients of federal dollars have never complied with this
requirement.”).
182 Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key Obama Rule on Housing
Segregation, CITYLAB (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trumpadministration-derailed-a-key-obama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/
[https://perma.cc/3BXT-E4KY] (“The Trump administration is rolling back the deadline for
a key rule on fair housing made into law under President Barack Obama—a change with
potentially broad consequences for racial segregation. The new guidance will give
communities until well after 2020 to comply with an Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
rule put in place two years ago.”).
183 Secretary Carson’s previous statements rejecting the notion of affirmatively furthering
fair housing suggest that it will not gain traction any time soon. Ben S. Carson, Opinion,
Experimenting with Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-tryto-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/EQ8U-8XMR] (critiquing HUD’s rule on affirmatively
furthering fair housing and referring to it as “social-engineering”); see also BARADARAN,
supra note 142, at 170 (arguing that, after George Romney’s retirement as HUD Secretary in
180
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Congress’s and courts’ hesitance to recognize the relationship between
economic citizenship and civil rights is consistent with the critiques of the
antidiscrimination doctrine as formalistic and rigid.184 The design of
antidiscrimination law, especially as connected to intentional discrimination,
represents a turn from structural equality and economic citizenship concerns to
prohibition of discrimination against specific and targeted individuals.185 As
discussed in detail in Part I, the protected class design of antidiscrimination law
has been understood and analyzed narrowly by the judiciary. Such a constrained
view, focused on the individual plaintiff’s identity, has operated to create
significant obstacles to attaining judicial relief and combatting entrenched
discrimination.186 Some scholars have gone so far as to consider the
antidiscrimination doctrine a wholesale failure in its attempts to remedy groupbased discrimination and achieve structural anti-subordination goals.187 Even for

1972, administrations would uniformly “follow Nixon’s strategy of enforcing the FHA
through litigating cases of outright discrimination . . . mak[ing] it clear that [they] would only
concern [themselves] with racial and not economic discrimination”).
184 Zietlow, supra note 163, at 255-56 (“Notwithstanding the powerful symbolism that
liberty has in the American psyche, liberty is largely absent from our late twentieth century
understanding of civil rights, which instead is based on the Equal Protection Clause and its
promise of formal equality. People of color and women of every race have made significant
advances under the equal protection model of equality, but they continue to lag behind whites
and men under virtually every economic index.” (emphasis omitted)).
185 Antidiscrimination law is not devoid of avenues to address structural discrimination.
For example, disparate impact is a means by which to challenge structural bias. See Bradley
A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV.
955, 960-67 (2012) (tracing antisubordination principles historically embedded in
employment discrimination law); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits
of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2006) (“Taken as a whole, . . . disparate
impact inquiry asks whether some aspect of the employer’s structural arrangement facilitates
or reflects biased decisionmaking, and whether the employer could reasonably structure
things differently to avoid that result.”). For intentional discrimination claims under Title VII
and other antidiscrimination statutes, however, the design of the law is focused on a bad actor
and an individual victim, leaving little room to address institutional or structural
discrimination factors.
186 See Clarke, supra note 42, at 167 (arguing that statutory design of antidiscrimination
law does not require that plaintiff prove that she is member of protected class to gain access
to protections, but that antidiscrimination doctrine has developed, primarily through
application of McDonnell Douglas test, to apply such requirement); supra Section I.B
(discussing antidiscrimination law’s class design and doctrine limiting ability of plaintiffs to
advance claims for judicial relief).
187 Some scholars reject the antidiscrimination approach to equity because the design and
implementation of the laws fail to remedy the actual needs of historically disenfranchised
groups in favor of individual and isolated rights. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content
of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 95-96 (1999) (asserting that rights-based
civil rights model was borne out of an understanding of the White experience, resulting in
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those who find significant value in the current antidiscrimination doctrine,
however, it is clear that the antidiscrimination doctrine has fallen short in
achieving economic citizenship.
III. THE NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Once it is clear that the consumer protection doctrine provides a doctrinal
avenue to remedy certain forms of discrimination, it remains necessary to
contend with the normative implications of using consumer protection to remedy
group-based harms like race or sex discrimination. Part I detailed the doctrinal
benefits and drawbacks of claims arising out of antidiscrimination law and
consumer protection law—the different remedies available, the relative ease of
proving the elements of each kind of claim, and the effect of the different venue
options. Part II set out the historical context, tracing the role of economic
citizenship in the fight for civil rights, its omission from the resulting
antidiscrimination law and doctrine, and the structural failures of the resulting
antidiscrimination doctrine. Recognizing the pragmatic benefit of the consumer
protection doctrine to remedy discrimination, this Part contends with the
downstream consequences that might flow from turning to a consumer
protection claim to remedy traditional civil rights violations. Situated in the
literature on colorblind, universalist, and race-conscious approaches to civil
rights concerns, this Part recognizes that making such a choice could operate to
erase subordination, oppression, and entrenched bias from the lawsuit. As law is
one critical tool in developing social understanding and norms, “hiding”
discrimination in a consumer protection claim could undermine civil rights
advocacy and protection, and risk perpetuating and further entrenching
inequalities.
A.

The Debate over Universalist Approaches

Remedying discrimination using consumer protection law is a universalist
approach to a civil rights problem. As the name suggests, universalist
approaches to civil rights violations are universal in their application and neutral
as to race, gender, disability, and other traditional identity-based protected
classes.188 Universalist protections, rights, or policies do not award or cabin
laws that failed to meet critical needs such as social and economic justice); Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (critiquing rights-based theory and
arguing that focus on rights obstructs progressive advances); see also Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 1253, 1296-97 (2011) (explaining development and history of “so-called rights
critique,” which was “actually a multifaceted debate that included hard and soft lines on both
sides”). But see Crenshaw, Race, supra note 59, at 1356-58 (recognizing both possibilities
and dangers of rights-based approach to civil rights and racial equality).
188 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2842 (defining “universalist approach to civil rights law as
one that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or benefits for all persons or, at least,
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rights via protected classes or other group-based identifiers. In that way,
universalist approaches differ both structurally and substantively from rights and
protections created through antidiscrimination statutes. Scholars across
constitutional and civil rights fields have analyzed and proposed universalist
approaches for workplace discrimination,189 voter discrimination and
suppression,190 and discrimination against people with disabilities,191 for
example. Those proposals utilize universalist laws and approaches across a
varied spectrum, from litigation to legislation to policymaking.
For some, the universalist approach is rooted in a rejection of a rights-based
approach to equality. Professor Richard Thompson Ford, for example, sets out a
laundry list of complaints about rights-based approaches based on their
downstream consequences.192 He argues, for example, that rights-based
approaches encourage narcissism and extremism.193 Ford complains that “[t]he
rhetoric of civil rights law has provided a convenience vehicle, if not an official
apologia, for a culture of entitlement, self-obsession, and self-righteousness that
warps popular politics and poisons popular culture.”194 This Article rejects those
contentions. To the contrary, this Article suggests that rights-based
antidiscrimination law has not gone far enough to protect Americans against
group- and identity-based discrimination.

guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad group of people not defined according to the
identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws”).
189 Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (proposing
claims arising under Family and Medical Leave Act to remedy workplace inequality); Eyer,
supra note 54, at 1343 (pointing to Family and Medical Leave Act as an alternate, universalist
claim to remedy workplace discrimination).
190 Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV.
95, 113-25 (2013) (arguing for universal regulatory oversight of voting in wake of Supreme
Court’s Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), decision finding Voting Rights Act’s
section 5 unconstitutional); Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From
Antidiscrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 748-55 (2006) (defending
universalist approach to voting rights in the context of 2006 Voting Rights Act
reauthorization).
191 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 70-75 (2004)
(explaining advantages of advancing universal social welfare programs over targeted
programs to advance interests of people with disabilities).
192 RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 20-25 (2011).
193 Id. at 23-24 (arguing that rights extremism has been reinforced and perpetuated by
popular culture, which has led to culture of entitlement and self-entitlement).
194 Id. at 24. Ford also critiques rights-based civil rights laws because they obscure
complexity, fail to challenge institutional and cultural injustices, limit the opportunity for
cooperative and pragmatic solutions, risk being exploited at the expense of common sense,
and crowd out new and creative means of achieving social justice. Id. at 19-25.
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Other scholars propose a turn toward universalist approaches as a pragmatic
solution to both a jurisprudential and cultural aversion to group-based rights and
protections.195 The concept is that judges, juries, legislators, and society at large
will be more responsive to claims that do not rely on group-based, identitydriven rights and protections.196 This Article aligns itself more with those
scholarly approaches. Recognizing the failures of antidiscrimination law to
achieve group-based equality goals, this Article suggests that consumer
protection is an untapped resource to better achieve these goals. Because
economic rights are inextricably linked to civil rights, however, this Article
further argues that consumer protection law usefully aligns with and
supplements the objectives of civil rights law.
Universalist approaches, however, have been met with significant and
compelling critique. Primarily, critics contend that universalist approaches
adopt, and thus condone, a post-racial197 colorblind perception of modern
America. The “colorblind” model198—a belief that the country has moved
beyond race and that each individual should be evaluated on his or her own
merits—has taken hold in our courts,199 our classrooms,200 and our national

195 See Eyer, supra note 54, at 1299 (suggesting that seeking “extra-discrimination
remedies” may allow plaintiffs to successfully sidestep judges’ and juries’ cultural and
psychological aversion to ascribing discrimination to almost any set of circumstances,
including those with direct evidence of animus).
196 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2848 (explaining why proponents of universalist legislation
and litigation advocacy “[posit] that universalist approaches are more durable” politically and
when challenged in court); Darby & Levy, supra note 64, at 389-90 (arguing in light of deeply
entrenched post-racial judicial and national narrative, advocates must embrace “postracial
remedies” as “essential tools for realizing egalitarian aspirations in our racially exhausted
society”); Yoshino, supra note 62, at 750 (suggesting that liberty-based dignity claims under
substantive due process framework may find greater success than equity-based equal
protection claims because the former “offers a way for the Court to ‘do’ equality in an era of
increasing pluralism anxiety”).
197 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 12 (defining “post-racial” as “a set of beliefs
that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by
America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial progress” (footnote omitted)).
198 Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995) (“Colorblindness is based on the concept that,
because race is immutable and arbitrary, race should be ignored in the allocation of burdens
and benefits.”).
199 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing possible explanations for
shift in Supreme Court’s attitude toward robust group-based equal protection); see also
Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2007) (reviewing dangers of color-blind approach to criminal justice).
200 Cf. Robert A. Blake, Jr., A Step Towards a Colorblind Society: Shaw v. Reno, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 937, 952-53 (1994) (discussing Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), which applied strict scrutiny to strike
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image.201 A critical review of the current state of American society, however,
presents clear evidence that individual and systemic bias against people based
on race, sex, national origin, and disability, among other traits and
characteristics, remains pervasive in America.202 In other words, even
proponents’ ideal of colorblindness is not the reality. In fact, as many scholars
argue, the false narrative of colorblindness operates to obscure, perpetuate, and
even advance racism and other biases.203
Even recognizing that universalist approaches afford some pragmatic benefit
to victims of discrimination, Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, the
architect of intersectionality theory and a prominent critical race theorist, warns
against “post-racial pragmatism.”204 She admonishes post-racial pragmatists for
condoning the existing power structure without naming or checking it.205 Rather
than framing universalist approaches as legitimate, pragmatic responses to a
colorblind jurisprudence, Crenshaw warns that post-racial pragmatism “brings
down lay-off program which discharged white teachers at higher rate than Black teachers,
even though program did not discriminate against historically discriminated group).
201 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 11-12 (2010) (recognizing that colorblindness is a “public consensus that
prevails in America today” and arguing that such sense has “blinded us to the realities of race
in our society”); Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1314 (“An entire industry of lawyers,
politicians, pundits, and foundations has worked over the past twenty years to convince
judges, policy makers, and voters that the project of racial reform was completed long ago.”);
cf. Jamin B. Raskin, From “Colorblind” White Supremacy to American Multiculturalism, 19
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 750-52 (1996) (arguing that nation is on fast-track to
multiculturalism, and that embracing such diversity is critical to moving past “regime of white
supremacy”).
202 See ALEXANDER, supra note 201, at 4 (detailing ways in which criminal justice system
has “emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social
control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”); MAHZARIN R. BANAJI &
ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 94-122 (2013)
(revealing, through psychological studies and tests, hidden (or implicit) biases that shape our
judgments about people’s abilities, characters, and potential).
203 See Chase, supra note 198, at 47 (arguing that colorblindness serves to obscure “root,
scope, and depth of the problem” and to “defend the unwitting racist”); Crenshaw, supra note
187, at 1326 (arguing that colorblindness has been used as “justification for civil rights
rollbacks”); Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility
and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901, 910 (1997) (arguing that
failure to explicitly deal with race and gender does not erase subordination, but instead
perpetuates it).
204 See Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1314 (“This pragmatism jettisons the liberal
ambivalence about race consciousness to embrace a colorblind stance even as it foregrounds
and celebrates the achievement of particular racial outcomes.”).
205 Id. at 1332 (arguing that, by failing to challenge the institutional power structure, postracialism “permits a deeper alignment with forces that deny that significant racial barriers
remain”).
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rock star marketability to colorblindness’s legitimizing project.”206 Other
scholars warn against “post-racial hydraulics,” which are negative downstream
consequences for embracing universalist approaches to employment
discrimination.207 They argue that ignoring group-based discrimination in favor
of universalist claims will stagnate the antidiscrimination doctrine, reinforce the
view that discrimination is a rare phenomenon, discourage lawyers from taking
discrimination cases, and push universalist approaches on clients without
respecting their autonomy and voice.208 Even those who have urged a
universalist response in certain arenas recognize the drawbacks to such an
approach, including the fact that the broad strokes to such an approach may be
less efficient or may result in backlash or “compassion fatigue.”209
The following draws on the debate over universalist approaches to consider
specifically what may be gained or lost by adopting consumer protection as a
lens for remedying certain forms of discrimination.210 This Article frames the
choice of a consumer protection approach as a substitute for a civil rights
approach, evaluating each as relative to the other. Although the Article analyzes
antidiscrimination law and consumer protection law as substitutes for each other,
it is not necessary to choose between the two claims for remedying
discrimination. In fact, the two claims could be both substitutes and
complements for organizing remedial demands.211 A litigation strategy relying
on consumer protection law could be part of a coordinated effort to address
certain forms of discrimination through litigation, legislation, and non-legal
means without limiting those extra-judicial methods to universalist strategies.
Even among proponents of universalist approaches to remedying traditional civil
rights issues, scholars have explicitly recognized that the universalist approach
need not (and should not) be treated as a singular strategy.212
A litigant like Julia could also stack her legal claims, pleading both violations
of civil rights law and consumer protection law. Although this Article frames
Julia’s claim choice as either/or (consumer protection or antidiscrimination),
Julia could stack the claims by asserting violations of both (or multiple) laws.
This Article treats antidiscrimination and consumer protection claims as
206

Id. at 1326.
Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 41-43.
208 Id. at 7; see also Kennedy, supra note 11, at 292-93 (rejecting universalist approach to
dealing with consumer discrimination because, even in their successes, universalist claims do
not “recognize the true nature of the harm—differential treatment because of their race”).
209 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2852.
210 See Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 41-43; Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2841.
211 See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 58-59 (2011).
212 See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2841(recognizing that universalistic approaches can,
and should, exist alongside particularistic approaches to address civil rights problems); Eyer,
supra note 54, at 1357 (proposing “some balance between the remedies that will most
effectively serve putative victims of discrimination now and the strategies that will most
effectively enhance the public salience of discrimination in the long-term”).
207
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alternates rather than complements for two reasons. First, such a frame offers a
cleaner lens for both the doctrinal and normative trade-off analysis. Second, the
focus here is on substitutes because there are significant risks and downsides to
stacking the claims. The consumer protection claims are likely to take a back
seat to the more complex and discovery-driven discrimination claims, opening
the plaintiff up to the downsides of the antidiscrimination claim without seeing
much benefit from adding the consumer protection claim.
B.

The Negative: The Drawbacks of the Universalist Approach Outweigh the
Benefits

Relying exclusively on consumer protection law to remedy discrimination
suffers from the overarching critiques of universalist approaches. It obscures the
element of bias, which arguably pardons the perpetrator of discrimination. It
diminishes the number of cases brought asserting housing or other
discrimination, which may have a long-term negative effect on the doctrine or
the social understanding of the rampant nature of housing discrimination.213
Additionally, by divorcing the discrimination from the economic implications,
it risks shrouding “the material consequences of racial exploitation and social
violence—including the persistence of educational inequity, the
disproportionate racial patterns of criminalization and incarceration, and the
deepening patterns of economic stratification.”214 In fact, it risks reinforcing the
Supreme Court’s recent turn from robust group-based civil rights protections; if
consumer protection affords an adequate remedy, identity-dependent civil rights
protections become less necessary. Scholars often talk about “naming” a
phenomenon; there is something about identifying and calling out an issue in the
law that gives the issue credibility, urgency, and visibility.215 In fact, much has
been written about the power to call one’s abuser to account and, with the full
power of the judicial system listening, name the source of the injustice.216 By
ignoring the connection between a victim’s identity characteristics (i.e. race or
gender) and the perpetrator’s adverse actions, consumer protection law ignores

213 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 76 (warning that universalist strategies
reinforce courts’ and society’s view that discrimination is rare phenomenon).
214 Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1327 (footnotes omitted).
215 See, e.g., Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 322 (1998) (pointing to Betty Friedan’s work as beginning of feminist
theorists’ work to “ensure that the question of naming would emerge as a fundamental issue
and as a hallmark of contemporary feminist theory”); cf. Laura A. Heymann, Naming,
Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 407-08 (recognizing that power to name is
power in and of itself).
216 See Leissner, supra note 215, at 328 (“In order to be redressed, therefore, a harm must
possess a name in law. One need only look at workplace sexual harassment, date rape,
domestic violence, marital rape, and adultery to comprehend the importance of naming a
harm.” (footnote omitted)).
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the institutional racial discrimination, and other biases, that have shaped our
national economy.217
The specific consumer context also raises concerns related to the attention
that market-driven consumer law pays to individual choices and responsibility.
Consumer law relies on and adopts America’s capitalist culture. In fact, a
building block of the tort and contract law upon which consumer protection law
was built is the concept of caveat emptor.218 Such a concept is born of a “laissezfaire philosophy that placed a premium on individual bargaining skills and
minimal government interference in standards of fair play.”219 Although the
1960s consumer movement for consumer protections was driven, in part, by a
recognition of the danger of power and information asymmetry in consumer
transactions, the system still operates within a market-driven capitalist structure.
America’s capitalist culture privileges the “pull yourself up by your
bootstraps,” “American Dream” kind of mentality. The concept of individual
merit and responsibility is so deeply connected to capitalism that it is hard to
pull the two apart. Thus, relying on consumer law, with its focus on individual
merit and responsibility, risks erasing more than just the role of bias or
discrimination in the transaction. Rather, it risks adopting and reinforcing a
system that elevates individual choice and intention above all; a system that
often ignores the role of structural and institutional forces.220 Structural,
governmental, and institutional forces have limited the ability of traditionally
oppressed groups in the United States to participate fully in consumer capitalism
and to gain economic citizenship.221 In fact, “[c]apitalist theory was even used

217 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 198, at 5-6 (exposing ways in which slavery and racial
oppression have shaped contract law, which has “became the means by which AfricanAmericans became inalienably disempowered; outsiders to the system of justice and equitable
economic opportunity”); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 997, 1002-03 (1985) (recognizing how contract law has failed women by
stereotyping them into binary and closed roles).
218 Frederick C. Wamhoff, Property—Caveat Emptor—Duty to Disclose Limited to
Commercial Vendors. Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) and
Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 548
(1981) (“The more lengthy expression is caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus
alienum emit which means let a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount and
nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution.”).
219 Robert Kwong, Fraud and the Duty to Disclose Off-Site Land Conditions: Actual
Knowledge vs. Seller Status, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 897, 901 (1997) (citing Wamhoff,
supra note 218, at 552).
220 See TRESSIE MCMILLIAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 187 (2017) (arguing that “perpetuating the inequalities
resulting from intergenerational cumulative disadvantage doesn’t require intent” and that
“racism and sexism work best of all when intent is not a prerequisite”).
221 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at vii-viii (2017) (arguing that legacy of de jure
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to fight basic antidiscrimination laws.”222 By ignoring the effects of generations
of structural bias and oppression, “hiding” discrimination claims in a consumer
law context risks erasing, and thus reinforcing, the problems of structural bias in
our consumer and financial sectors.
C.

The Affirmative: The Benefits of the Universalist Approach Outweigh the
Drawbacks

There is, however, a flip side of the normative coin. While relying on a
universalist tool to remedy civil rights violations might obscure the element of
bias, the trade-off is a higher likelihood of success. In Julia’s case, the doctrinal
analysis resulted in a seemingly large differential in the likelihood of succeeding
on her consumer protection claim relative to her discrimination claim. UDAP
statutes are read broadly and have fewer essential elements of proof. Julia need
not prove discrimination or intentional bias, which empiricists have established
is not an easy task, especially as discrimination has become more subtle and
harder to prove.223 UDAP statutes are friendlier to intersectional plaintiffs like
Julia, who are not forced to either identify or prove which thread of their
identities led to the adverse or discriminatory action, an undertaking that
theorists have established is nearly impossible and counter-productive.224 This
likelihood of success has implications for Julia and for society at large.
First and foremost, it achieves Julia’s goals. It is impossible and unethical to
ignore the client’s desire for a legal remedy in analyzing these normative

structural segregation at local, state, and federal levels—even more than intentional individual
discrimination—created and promoted wide-spread neighborhood racial segregation that
persists today); Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071,
1081 (2017) (“The 20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United States is not a
manifestation of cultural or individual differences, but the product of a long history of
discriminatory laws and policies that inscribed racial disparities into society.”); see also
BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 164-214 (tracing how focus on “black capitalism,” without
simultaneous reckoning with historic and systemic limitations on wealth development in
Black communities, was “deployed as a decoy instead of an honest account of a systemic
problem”).
222 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 210 (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962)).
223 Eyer, supra note 54, at 1276 (noting “less than 5% of all discrimination plaintiffs will
ever achieve any form of litigated relief”); see also Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6,
at 14-15 (citing studies and scholars concluding that employment discrimination cases are
difficult to prove, vulnerable to summary judgment rulings, and face uphill battles because
judges and juries believe that employment discrimination has been largely eradicated).
224 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 149-50 (“Black women’s experiences are much
broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the continued
insistence that Black women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses
that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be
addressed.”).
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questions. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct make clear that a lawyer
has a duty to zealously advocate for her client’s position “despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer” and “take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”225
Although opponents of universalist approaches to civil rights issues critique
pragmatist-lawyers, they do so without a convincing answer to a client facing a
losing discrimination action. For example, in their compelling critique of
universalist proposals and identification of the secondary post-racial hydraulics,
Professors Alexander, Eigen, and Rich give little more than a nod to a lawyer’s
responsibility to achieve the client’s goals.226 When the client’s goal is to recover
money or otherwise succeed on a legal claim, does a lawyer not have a
responsibility to find a viable legal claim that will achieve that goal? Alexander,
Eigen, and Rich acknowledge that empirical studies evidence low success rates
for employment discrimination plaintiffs and interviews with employment
attorneys establish that Title VII cases are nearly impossible to win in court.227
Yet they simultaneously condemn pragmatist-lawyers for choosing alternate
universalist claims, arguing that the short-term win for the client is not worth the
long-term harm to racial justice.228 That might well be the case in the abstract,
but it sits in conflict with the lawyer’s ethical duty to the client, a foremost
responsibility in lawyering.229
Second, there are long-term adverse consequences to racial justice initiatives
if plaintiffs in discrimination suits lose in court. A loss in court, even one based
on technical or evidentiary barriers, officially pardons the perpetrator for his
conduct. Additionally, losses in discrimination actions reinforce the notion that
discrimination claims have no merit, create bad precedent, and negatively affect
the individual client and her community. In other words, pursuit of the losing
argument may do more harm than good. Not only does the individual client lose
possible damages and incur the financial and emotional costs of the lawsuit, but
the antidiscrimination doctrine is padded with one more negative opinion.
225

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
See Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 51-52 (dismissing importance of client
goals by stating that although “[s]ome plaintiffs will prefer the substitution of a universalist
claim . . . [t]heir reasons for preferring universalism, however, may stem from disturbing
factors that we should disrupt rather than accept as a matter of course”).
227 Id. at 12, 33-37 (“As an initial matter, the attorneys in our sample were united in their
judgment that winning a Title VII claim in federal court is much harder today than in the past
and in their perception that FLSA claims can be substantially easier to litigate, and thus more
viable, than Title VII claims.”).
228 Id. at 12, 20 (criticizing universalist strategies, stating “[t]he mistake in such strategies
is in emphasizing short term ‘wins’ rather than taking on the more difficult project of
educating and persuading persons who are unprepared to recognize contemporary racism”).
229 Serious attention should be paid to the ethical implications of the universalist versus
particularist debate in the civil rights literature. While a thorough analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article, I look forward to taking it up in a future project.
226
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There is also an argument that the universality of consumerism offers a point
of connection across which coalitions might be forged and experiences
shared.230 As President Kennedy reminded Congress in 1962, “Consumers, by
definition, include us all.”231 Consumer law and protection offer a potential lens
through which those with different backgrounds could find common ground.
This is particularly salient in the consumer protection context today. Americans
are still reeling from deep-seated fraud and deception of consumers that led to
the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession. Scholars and advocates
have made the profound connection between the predatory and discriminatory
conduct aimed at vulnerable communities and the deep and lasting effects on the
entire national economy.232 It is, perhaps, a singular moment for varied and
diverse groups to recognize that our consumer culture’s failure to afford
universal economic citizenship negatively affects both the direct targets of
discrimination and the entire national culture and economy.
CONCLUSION
This Article reviews the potential connections and disconnections between
the consumer protection and antidiscrimination policies and doctrines. While it
does not argue that consumer protection law is always a better avenue to
remedying relevant discrimination than traditional antidiscrimination law,233 it
offers a framework through which advocates, policymakers, and scholars can
consider the claims. It observes that the civil rights movements and their leaders
understood the inextricable relationship between economic and civil rights. It
also recognizes that the antidiscrimination law, as developed, omits economic
citizenship and leaves many victims of discrimination out of its protection. It
suggests, therefore, that consumer protection may, perhaps paradoxically, better
achieve certain civil rights goals than the antidiscrimination framework.
Thus, this Article asserts that, for victims of discrimination like Julia, and
others who are consistently left out of the rigid protections of antidiscrimination
230

See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2848-74 (arguing that one expressive benefit of
universalist approach is de-essentializing of identity and opportunity to build unexpected
coalitions).
231 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Protecting the Consumer
Interest, in 1962 PUB. PAPERS 235, 235 (Mar. 15, 1962).
232 See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 8 (2009) (“The frightening aspect, however, is that what
began as a subprime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky mortgages, and
contributed to excess home inventories, defaults, and foreclosures that have pushed down
home prices for even the most responsible borrowers and homeowners.”); Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2189 (2007) (“A host of
empirical studies leaves no serious doubt that predatory mortgage lending is a significant
problem for American society.”).
233 See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 141, at 434 (warning scholars against coming to any
“grand, absolutist theories about courts, lawyers, and social change”).
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law, consumer protection is a valid and valuable alternative. And it goes further.
It reflects on the words of Richard Cordray, the first director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau:
The foundations of justice and equality are essential in our economic affairs
if we are each to find our way toward earning the fulfillment of our goals
and aspirations. . . . [I]f we are to attain a true and full understanding of
civil rights in this country, it must encompass not only political and legal
rights, but also economic rights. . . . So together with the related rights to
obtain money, to hold money, and to deploy money on fair and equal terms,
the right to credit or fair lending becomes a basic pillar of the economic
rights that are intertwined with civil rights in this particular society.234
Consumer protection is and should be seen as a tool in the fight for civil rights.
Such an approach is not limited to factual situations identical to Julia’s.
Consumer protection law might be applied to unlawful pre-employment
contracts.235 It may apply to prospective students.236 The analysis herein could
be applied to situations traditionally arising under Title II,237 which involves
discrimination in public accommodations, and Title III,238 which involves
discrimination in public institutions. Federal consumer protection laws prohibit
misrepresentations in lending (Truth in Lending Act239 and Equal Credit
234

Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Lecture on Economic
Rights as Civil Rights at Michigan State University (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.consumer
finance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-director-richard-cordrays-prepared-lecture-oneconomic-rights-as-civil-rights-at-michigan-state-university/ [https://perma.cc/R9FEBVBM].
235 See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 312 (N.C. 1999) (finding sufficient
facts and circumstances existed to extend UDAP protections to individuals in employeremployee relationship where it was not a general employer/employee dispute and the actions
affected commerce); Gress v. Rowboat Co., 661 S.E.2d 278, 282 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding that general presumption against application of the UDTPA did not apply outside of
true employer-employee relationship).
236 See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Duke Univ., No. 1:14-cv-00697, 2015 WL 4094175, at *2
(M.D.N.C. July 7, 2015) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under North Carolina UDTPA
based on allegations that defendant engaged in conduct, including making false statements,
to induce plaintiff to enroll at Duke rather than Princeton).
237 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.”).
238 Id. § 2000b (stating Attorney General may institute civil actions when notified by
individual of “being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection
of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal
utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any
State or subdivision thereof”).
239 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
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Opportunity Act),240 debt collection (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act),241
leasing (Consumer Leasing Act),242 credit reporting (Fair Credit Reporting
Act),243 and real estate mortgage servicing (Real Estate Settlements Procedures
Act).244 There are many opportunities to consider the role that consumer
protection law can play in effectuating traditional civil rights goals, especially
as between economic and civil rights.
Today, consumer protections sit at a crossroads. Major legislation like the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and significant
government oversight through the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are
facing legal and political challenges.245 This Article suggests that a deeper
understanding of the historical and modern connections between civil rights and
consumer protection will prove useful to the national conversation on these
issues. It challenges advocates, policymakers, and scholars to consider the role
of economic rights in antidiscrimination law and the role of antidiscrimination
in consumer protection law.

readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and
to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.”).
240 Id. § 1691 (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age.”).
241 Id. § 1692 (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
242 Id. § 1667 (providing certain requirements for disclosure regarding personal property
leases).
243 Id. § 1681 (“There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their
grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to
privacy.”).
244 27 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to effect certain
changes in the settlement process for residential real estate that will result—(1) in more
effective advance disclosure to home buyers and sellers of settlement costs; (2) in the
elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain
settlement services; (3) in a reduction in the amounts home buyers are required to place in
escrow accounts established to insure the payment of real estate taxes and insurance; and (4)
in significant reform and modernization of local recordkeeping of land title information.”).
245 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en
banc, 881 F.3d 75, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reversing court’s prior ruling that Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau’s structure was unconstitutional); Gillian B. White, Trump
Begins to Chip Away at Banking Regulations, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/trump-dodd-frank/515646/ [https://pe
rma.cc/N8VA-HP83] (detailing President Trump’s plans to scale back significant provisions
of Dodd-Frank legislation and target Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).

